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CVE-2018-20187

Опубликовано: 08 мар. 2019
Источник: debian

Описание

A side-channel issue was discovered in Botan before 2.9.0. An attacker capable of precisely measuring the time taken for ECC key generation may be able to derive information about the high bits of the secret key, as the function to derive the public point from the secret scalar uses an unblinded Montgomery ladder whose loop iteration count depends on the bitlength of the secret. This issue affects only key generation, not ECDSA signatures or ECDH key agreement.

Пакеты

ПакетСтатусВерсия исправленияРелизТип
botanfixed2.9.0-1experimentalpackage
botanfixed2.9.0-2package
botan1.10not-affectedpackage

Примечания

  • https://github.com/randombit/botan/pull/1792

  • https://github.com/randombit/botan/commit/70aa7303acfff9eefc24598c289a84db3579ebd1

Связанные уязвимости

CVSS3: 5.9
ubuntu
почти 7 лет назад

A side-channel issue was discovered in Botan before 2.9.0. An attacker capable of precisely measuring the time taken for ECC key generation may be able to derive information about the high bits of the secret key, as the function to derive the public point from the secret scalar uses an unblinded Montgomery ladder whose loop iteration count depends on the bitlength of the secret. This issue affects only key generation, not ECDSA signatures or ECDH key agreement.

CVSS3: 5.9
nvd
почти 7 лет назад

A side-channel issue was discovered in Botan before 2.9.0. An attacker capable of precisely measuring the time taken for ECC key generation may be able to derive information about the high bits of the secret key, as the function to derive the public point from the secret scalar uses an unblinded Montgomery ladder whose loop iteration count depends on the bitlength of the secret. This issue affects only key generation, not ECDSA signatures or ECDH key agreement.

CVSS3: 5.9
github
больше 3 лет назад

A side-channel issue was discovered in Botan before 2.9.0. An attacker capable of precisely measuring the time taken for ECC key generation may be able to derive information about the high bits of the secret key, as the function to derive the public point from the secret scalar uses an unblinded Montgomery ladder whose loop iteration count depends on the bitlength of the secret. This issue affects only key generation, not ECDSA signatures or ECDH key agreement.