Описание
A message-forgery issue was discovered in crypto/openpgp/clearsign/clearsign.go in supplementary Go cryptography libraries 2019-03-25. According to the OpenPGP Message Format specification in RFC 4880 chapter 7, a cleartext signed message can contain one or more optional "Hash" Armor Headers. The "Hash" Armor Header specifies the message digest algorithm(s) used for the signature. However, the Go clearsign package ignores the value of this header, which allows an attacker to spoof it. Consequently, an attacker can lead a victim to believe the signature was generated using a different message digest algorithm than what was actually used. Moreover, since the library skips Armor Header parsing in general, an attacker can not only embed arbitrary Armor Headers, but also prepend arbitrary text to cleartext messages without invalidating the signatures.
Пакеты
| Пакет | Статус | Версия исправления | Релиз | Тип |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| golang-go.crypto | fixed | 1:0.0~git20200221.2aa609c-1 | package |
Примечания
https://go.googlesource.com/crypto/+/c05e17bb3b2dca130fc919668a96b4bec9eb9442
Patch fixes the second part of the CVE ("prepend arbitrary text")
but not the first ("ignores the value of [the Hash] header"), as hinted at reporter's 2019-05-09 note:
https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/152840/Go-Cryptography-Libraries-Cleartext-Message-Spoofing.html
Upstream feels that this is not a security issue. See https://github.com/golang/go/issues/41200.
Связанные уязвимости
A message-forgery issue was discovered in crypto/openpgp/clearsign/clearsign.go in supplementary Go cryptography libraries 2019-03-25. According to the OpenPGP Message Format specification in RFC 4880 chapter 7, a cleartext signed message can contain one or more optional "Hash" Armor Headers. The "Hash" Armor Header specifies the message digest algorithm(s) used for the signature. However, the Go clearsign package ignores the value of this header, which allows an attacker to spoof it. Consequently, an attacker can lead a victim to believe the signature was generated using a different message digest algorithm than what was actually used. Moreover, since the library skips Armor Header parsing in general, an attacker can not only embed arbitrary Armor Headers, but also prepend arbitrary text to cleartext messages without invalidating the signatures.
A message-forgery issue was discovered in crypto/openpgp/clearsign/clearsign.go in supplementary Go cryptography libraries 2019-03-25. According to the OpenPGP Message Format specification in RFC 4880 chapter 7, a cleartext signed message can contain one or more optional "Hash" Armor Headers. The "Hash" Armor Header specifies the message digest algorithm(s) used for the signature. However, the Go clearsign package ignores the value of this header, which allows an attacker to spoof it. Consequently, an attacker can lead a victim to believe the signature was generated using a different message digest algorithm than what was actually used. Moreover, since the library skips Armor Header parsing in general, an attacker can not only embed arbitrary Armor Headers, but also prepend arbitrary text to cleartext messages without invalidating the signatures.
