Описание
The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption key is periodically renewed.
Пакеты
| Пакет | Статус | Версия исправления | Релиз | Тип |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| linux | fixed | 5.10.46-1 | package | |
| linux | fixed | 4.19.194-1 | buster | package |
| firmware-nonfree | fixed | 20210716-1~exp1 | experimental | package |
| firmware-nonfree | fixed | 20210818-1 | package | |
| firmware-nonfree | no-dsa | bullseye | package |
Примечания
https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/usenix2021.pdf
https://www.fragattacks.com/
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00473.html
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/c4d8c2f040b368225b72a91e74ee282d9ceab4d5.camel@coelho.fi/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/20210511180259.159598-1-johannes@sipsolutions.net/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/20210511200110.3f8290e59823.I622a67769ed39257327a362cfc09c812320eb979@changeid/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/20210511200110.037aa5ca0390.I7bb888e2965a0db02a67075fcb5deb50eb7408aa@changeid/
firmware-nonfree (iwlwifi-fw-2021-05-12) addressed the firmware part of the CVE
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/firmware/linux-firmware.git/commit/?id=55d964905a2b6cd790cbbbb46640bb2fb520b0cb
EPSS
Связанные уязвимости
The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption key is periodically renewed.
The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption key is periodically renewed.
The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption key is periodically renewed.
Windows Wireless Networking Information Disclosure Vulnerability
The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption key is periodically renewed.
EPSS