Описание
The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets.
Пакеты
| Пакет | Статус | Версия исправления | Релиз | Тип |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| linux | fixed | 5.10.46-1 | package | |
| linux | fixed | 4.19.194-1 | buster | package |
| firmware-nonfree | fixed | 20210716-1~exp1 | experimental | package |
| firmware-nonfree | fixed | 20210818-1 | package | |
| firmware-nonfree | no-dsa | bullseye | package |
Примечания
https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/usenix2021.pdf
https://www.fragattacks.com/
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00473.html
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/c4d8c2f040b368225b72a91e74ee282d9ceab4d5.camel@coelho.fi/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/20210511180259.159598-1-johannes@sipsolutions.net/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/20210511200110.25d93176ddaf.I9e265b597f2cd23eb44573f35b625947b386a9de@changeid/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/20210511200110.11968c725b5c.Idd166365ebea2771c0c0a38c78b5060750f90e17@changeid/
Mitigation for similar attack to CVE-2020-24588:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/20210511200110.0b2b886492f0.I23dd5d685fe16d3b0ec8106e8f01b59f499dffed@changeid/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/20210511200110.076543300172.I548e6e71f1ee9cad4b9a37bf212ae7db723587aa@changeid/
firmware-nonfree (iwlwifi-fw-2021-05-12) addressed the firmware part of the CVE
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/firmware/linux-firmware.git/commit/?id=55d964905a2b6cd790cbbbb46640bb2fb520b0cb
EPSS
Связанные уязвимости
The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets.
The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets.
The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets.
The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets.
EPSS