Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute Back during the discussion of commit a9a3ed1eff36 ("x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try") we discussed the need for a function attribute to control the omission of stack protectors on a per-function basis; at the time Clang had support for no_stack_protector but GCC did not. This was fixed in gcc-11. Now that the function attribute is available, let's start using it. Callers of boot_init_stack_canary need to use this function attribute unless they're compiled with -fno-stack-protector, otherwise the canary stored in the stack slot of the caller will differ upon the call to boot_init_stack_canary. This will lead to a call to __stack_chk_fail() then panic.
Пакеты
| Пакет | Статус | Версия исправления | Релиз | Тип |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| linux | fixed | 6.4.4-1 | package |
Примечания
https://git.kernel.org/linus/514ca14ed5444b911de59ed3381dfd195d99fe4b (6.5-rc1)
EPSS
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute Back during the discussion of commit a9a3ed1eff36 ("x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try") we discussed the need for a function attribute to control the omission of stack protectors on a per-function basis; at the time Clang had support for no_stack_protector but GCC did not. This was fixed in gcc-11. Now that the function attribute is available, let's start using it. Callers of boot_init_stack_canary need to use this function attribute unless they're compiled with -fno-stack-protector, otherwise the canary stored in the stack slot of the caller will differ upon the call to boot_init_stack_canary. This will lead to a call to __stack_chk_fail() then panic.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute Back during the discussion of commit a9a3ed1eff36 ("x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try") we discussed the need for a function attribute to control the omission of stack protectors on a per-function basis; at the time Clang had support for no_stack_protector but GCC did not. This was fixed in gcc-11. Now that the function attribute is available, let's start using it. Callers of boot_init_stack_canary need to use this function attribute unless they're compiled with -fno-stack-protector, otherwise the canary stored in the stack slot of the caller will differ upon the call to boot_init_stack_canary. This will lead to a call to __stack_chk_fail() then panic.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute Back during the discussion of commit a9a3ed1eff36 ("x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try") we discussed the need for a function attribute to control the omission of stack protectors on a per-function basis; at the time Clang had support for no_stack_protector but GCC did not. This was fixed in gcc-11. Now that the function attribute is available, let's start using it. Callers of boot_init_stack_canary need to use this function attribute unless they're compiled with -fno-stack-protector, otherwise the canary stored in the stack slot of the caller will differ upon the call to boot_init_stack_canary. This will lead to a call to __stack_chk_fail() then panic.
Уязвимость функции __stack_chk_fail() ядра операционной системы Linux, позволяющая нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании
EPSS