ΠΠΏΠΈΡΠ°Π½ΠΈΠ΅
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs->gp is never used since the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other means. [From the email thread] The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec. childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable from userspace in at least five ways: 1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers zeroed by the memset in the patch comment. This is a bug in its own right, but I'm unwilling to bet that it is the only way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch. 2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only happen at user/kernel boundaries. 3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is perfectly happy to read pt_regs for user_mode_helpers before the exec completes, but gp is not one of the registers it returns. 4. PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER: LOCKDOWN_PERF normally prevents access to kernel addresses via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR, but due to this bug kernel addresses are also exposed via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER which is permitted under LOCKDOWN_PERF. I have not attempted to write exploit code. 5. Much of the tracing infrastructure allows access to user registers. I have not attempted to determine which forms of tracing allow access to user registers without already allowing access to kernel registers.
ΠΠ°ΠΊΠ΅ΡΡ
| ΠΠ°ΠΊΠ΅Ρ | Π‘ΡΠ°ΡΡΡ | ΠΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΡ ΠΈΡΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ | Π Π΅Π»ΠΈΠ· | Π’ΠΈΠΏ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| linux | fixed | 6.8.9-1 | package | |
| linux | fixed | 6.1.85-1 | bookworm | package |
| linux | fixed | 5.10.216-1 | bullseye | package |
ΠΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅ΡΠ°Π½ΠΈΡ
https://git.kernel.org/linus/d14fa1fcf69db9d070e75f1c4425211fa619dfc8 (6.9-rc3)
EPSS
Π‘Π²ΡΠ·Π°Π½Π½ΡΠ΅ ΡΡΠ·Π²ΠΈΠΌΠΎΡΡΠΈ
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs->gp is never used since the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other means. [From the email thread] The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec. childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable from userspace in at least five ways: 1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has sp...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs->gp is never used since the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other means. [From the email thread] The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec. childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable from userspace in at least five ways: 1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has sp...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs->gp is never used since the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other means. [From the email thread] The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec. childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable from userspace in at least five ways: 1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs->gp is never used since the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other means. [From the email thread] The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec. childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable from userspace in at least five ways: 1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kern...
Π£ΡΠ·Π²ΠΈΠΌΠΎΡΡΡ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΠΎΠ½Π΅Π½ΡΠ° riscv ΡΠ΄ΡΠ° ΠΎΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ Linux, ΠΏΠΎΠ·Π²ΠΎΠ»ΡΡΡΠ°Ρ Π½Π°ΡΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅Π»Ρ Π²ΡΠ·Π²Π°ΡΡ ΠΎΡΠΊΠ°Π· Π² ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ»ΡΠΆΠΈΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠΈ
EPSS