Описание
Let's Encrypt client and ACME library written in Go (Lego). In versions 4.25.1 and below, the github.com/go-acme/lego/v4/acme/api package (thus the lego library and the lego cli as well) don't enforce HTTPS when talking to CAs as an ACME client. Unlike the http-01 challenge which solves an ACME challenge over unencrypted HTTP, the ACME protocol requires HTTPS when a client communicates with the CA to performs ACME functions. However, the library fails to enforce HTTPS both in the original discover URL (configured by the library user) and in the subsequent addresses returned by the CAs in the directory and order objects. If users input HTTP URLs or CAs misconfigure endpoints, protocol operations occur over HTTP instead of HTTPS. This compromises privacy by exposing request/response details like account and request identifiers to network attackers. This was fixed in version 4.25.2.
Пакеты
| Пакет | Статус | Версия исправления | Релиз | Тип |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| golang-github-xenolf-lego | unfixed | package | ||
| golang-github-xenolf-lego | no-dsa | trixie | package | |
| golang-github-xenolf-lego | no-dsa | bookworm | package | |
| golang-github-xenolf-lego | ignored | bullseye | package |
Примечания
https://github.com/go-acme/lego/security/advisories/GHSA-q82r-2j7m-9rv4
Fixed by: https://github.com/go-acme/lego/commit/238454b5f74f3cfcbb244ff0d0dc914a4ad44b96 (v4.25.2)
Workaround: CA endpoint should enforce HTTPS instead of HTTP.
EPSS
Связанные уязвимости
Let's Encrypt client and ACME library written in Go (Lego). In versions 4.25.1 and below, the github.com/go-acme/lego/v4/acme/api package (thus the lego library and the lego cli as well) don't enforce HTTPS when talking to CAs as an ACME client. Unlike the http-01 challenge which solves an ACME challenge over unencrypted HTTP, the ACME protocol requires HTTPS when a client communicates with the CA to performs ACME functions. However, the library fails to enforce HTTPS both in the original discover URL (configured by the library user) and in the subsequent addresses returned by the CAs in the directory and order objects. If users input HTTP URLs or CAs misconfigure endpoints, protocol operations occur over HTTP instead of HTTPS. This compromises privacy by exposing request/response details like account and request identifiers to network attackers. This was fixed in version 4.25.2.
A flaw was found in github.com/go-acme/lego. The LEGO ACME client and library fail to enforce HTTPS communication when interacting with Certificate Authorities, allowing unencrypted data transmission. This vulnerability allows a malicious Certificate Authority or intermediary to intercept and potentially modify ACME requests, leading to eavesdropping and manipulation of the ACME authentication process.
Let's Encrypt client and ACME library written in Go (Lego). In versions 4.25.1 and below, the github.com/go-acme/lego/v4/acme/api package (thus the lego library and the lego cli as well) don't enforce HTTPS when talking to CAs as an ACME client. Unlike the http-01 challenge which solves an ACME challenge over unencrypted HTTP, the ACME protocol requires HTTPS when a client communicates with the CA to performs ACME functions. However, the library fails to enforce HTTPS both in the original discover URL (configured by the library user) and in the subsequent addresses returned by the CAs in the directory and order objects. If users input HTTP URLs or CAs misconfigure endpoints, protocol operations occur over HTTP instead of HTTPS. This compromises privacy by exposing request/response details like account and request identifiers to network attackers. This was fixed in version 4.25.2.
EPSS