Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovpn: respect peer refcount in CMD_NEW_PEER error path ovpn_nl_peer_new_doit()'s error path calls ovpn_peer_release() directly rather than ovpn_peer_put(), bypassing the kref. The accompanying comment ("peer was not yet hashed, thus it is not used in any context") holds for UDP but not for TCP. For UDP, the ovpn_socket union uses the .ovpn arm and never points back at a peer; UDP encap_recv looks up peers via the not-yet-populated hashtables, so the new peer is unreachable until ovpn_peer_add() publishes it. For TCP, ovpn_socket_new() sets ovpn_sock->peer and ovpn_tcp_socket_attach() publishes ovpn_sock via rcu_assign_sk_user_data(). From that moment until ovpn_socket_release() detaches in the error path, the TCP fd is fully wired: userspace recvmsg / sendmsg / close / poll on the fd, as well as the strparser-driven ovpn_tcp_rcv() path, can reach the peer through sk_user_data -> ovpn_sock->peer and bump its refcount via ovpn_peer_hold(). ovpn_tcp_socket_wait_finish() (called inside ovpn_socket_release()) drains strparser and the tx work, but does not synchronize with userspace syscall callers that already hold a peer reference. If ovpn_nl_peer_modify() or ovpn_peer_add() returns an error while such a caller is in flight - notably an ovpn_tcp_recvmsg() blocked in __skb_recv_datagram() on peer->tcp.user_queue - the direct ovpn_peer_release() destroys the peer while the caller still holds the reference, and the eventual ovpn_peer_put() from that caller operates on freed memory. Replace the direct destructor call with ovpn_peer_put() so the kref correctly defers destruction until the last reference is dropped. In the common case where no concurrent user is present, behaviour is unchanged: the kref hits zero immediately and ovpn_peer_release_kref() runs the same destructor. With this conversion ovpn_peer_release() has no callers outside peer.c - ovpn_peer_release_kref() in the same translation unit is the only remaining user - so make it static and drop its declaration from peer.h.
Пакеты
| Пакет | Статус | Версия исправления | Релиз | Тип |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| linux | fixed | 7.0.12-1 | package | |
| linux | not-affected | trixie | package | |
| linux | not-affected | bookworm | package | |
| linux | not-affected | bullseye | package |
Примечания
https://git.kernel.org/linus/1fef6614673ff0846d30acdeeaf3cf98bb5f6116 (7.1-rc5)
EPSS
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovpn: respect peer refcount in CMD_NEW_PEER error path ovpn_nl_peer_new_doit()'s error path calls ovpn_peer_release() directly rather than ovpn_peer_put(), bypassing the kref. The accompanying comment ("peer was not yet hashed, thus it is not used in any context") holds for UDP but not for TCP. For UDP, the ovpn_socket union uses the .ovpn arm and never points back at a peer; UDP encap_recv looks up peers via the not-yet-populated hashtables, so the new peer is unreachable until ovpn_peer_add() publishes it. For TCP, ovpn_socket_new() sets ovpn_sock->peer and ovpn_tcp_socket_attach() publishes ovpn_sock via rcu_assign_sk_user_data(). From that moment until ovpn_socket_release() detaches in the error path, the TCP fd is fully wired: userspace recvmsg / sendmsg / close / poll on the fd, as well as the strparser-driven ovpn_tcp_rcv() path, can reach the peer through sk_user_data -> ovpn_sock->peer and bump its refcount...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovpn: respect peer refcount in CMD_NEW_PEER error path ovpn_nl_peer_new_doit()'s error path calls ovpn_peer_release() directly rather than ovpn_peer_put(), bypassing the kref. The accompanying comment ("peer was not yet hashed, thus it is not used in any context") holds for UDP but not for TCP. For UDP, the ovpn_socket union uses the .ovpn arm and never points back at a peer; UDP encap_recv looks up peers via the not-yet-populated hashtables, so the new peer is unreachable until ovpn_peer_add() publishes it. For TCP, ovpn_socket_new() sets ovpn_sock->peer and ovpn_tcp_socket_attach() publishes ovpn_sock via rcu_assign_sk_user_data(). From that moment until ovpn_socket_release() detaches in the error path, the TCP fd is fully wired: userspace recvmsg / sendmsg / close / poll on the fd, as well as the strparser-driven ovpn_tcp_rcv() path, can reach the peer through sk_user_data -> ovpn_sock->peer and bump its refcount...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovpn: respect peer refcount in CMD_NEW_PEER error path ovpn_nl_peer_new_doit()'s error path calls ovpn_peer_release() directly rather than ovpn_peer_put(), bypassing the kref. The accompanying comment ("peer was not yet hashed, thus it is not used in any context") holds for UDP but not for TCP. For UDP, the ovpn_socket union uses the .ovpn arm and never points back at a peer; UDP encap_recv looks up peers via the not-yet-populated hashtables, so the new peer is unreachable until ovpn_peer_add() publishes it. For TCP, ovpn_socket_new() sets ovpn_sock->peer and ovpn_tcp_socket_attach() publishes ovpn_sock via rcu_assign_sk_user_data(). From that moment until ovpn_socket_release() detaches in the error path, the TCP fd is fully wired: userspace recvmsg / sendmsg / close / poll on the fd, as well as the strparser-driven ovpn_tcp_rcv() path, can reach the peer through sk_user_data -> ovpn_sock->peer and bump its refcoun
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovpn: respect peer refcount in CMD_NEW_PEER error path ovpn_nl_peer_new_doit()'s error path calls ovpn_peer_release() directly rather than ovpn_peer_put(), bypassing the kref. The accompanying comment ("peer was not yet hashed, thus it is not used in any context") holds for UDP but not for TCP. For UDP, the ovpn_socket union uses the .ovpn arm and never points back at a peer; UDP encap_recv looks up peers via the not-yet-populated hashtables, so the new peer is unreachable until ovpn_peer_add() publishes it. For TCP, ovpn_socket_new() sets ovpn_sock->peer and ovpn_tcp_socket_attach() publishes ovpn_sock via rcu_assign_sk_user_data(). From that moment until ovpn_socket_release() detaches in the error path, the TCP fd is fully wired: userspace recvmsg / sendmsg / close / poll on the fd, as well as the strparser-driven ovpn_tcp_rcv() path, can reach the peer through sk_user_data -> ovpn_sock->peer and bump its refc...
EPSS