Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: at76c50x-usb: avoid length underflow in at76_guess_freq() at76_guess_freq() checks only that the received frame is at least a bare 802.11 header (24 bytes) before subtracting the fixed management-body offset: len -= el_off; For both beacon and probe response frames, el_off is 36. If the frame is shorter than el_off, subtracting it causes the calculated IE length to wrap. The length is eventually passed to cfg80211_find_elem_match() as a very large unsigned value, so the element walk runs beyond the RX skb. This path is reached from at76_rx_tasklet() while scanning. If the device delivers a truncated beacon or probe response, the oversized IE length causes an out-of-bounds read during scanning. Skip the IE lookup if the frame does not reach the variable elements, before subtracting el_off.
Пакеты
| Пакет | Статус | Версия исправления | Релиз | Тип |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| linux | fixed | 7.1.6-1 | package | |
| linux | fixed | 6.12.101-1 | trixie | package |
Примечания
https://git.kernel.org/linus/61a799ffd1e5a4fd3702d547828b7ff3d161468e (7.2-rc5)
EPSS
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: at76c50x-usb: avoid length underflow in at76_guess_freq() at76_guess_freq() checks only that the received frame is at least a bare 802.11 header (24 bytes) before subtracting the fixed management-body offset: len -= el_off; For both beacon and probe response frames, el_off is 36. If the frame is shorter than el_off, subtracting it causes the calculated IE length to wrap. The length is eventually passed to cfg80211_find_elem_match() as a very large unsigned value, so the element walk runs beyond the RX skb. This path is reached from at76_rx_tasklet() while scanning. If the device delivers a truncated beacon or probe response, the oversized IE length causes an out-of-bounds read during scanning. Skip the IE lookup if the frame does not reach the variable elements, before subtracting el_off.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: at76c50x-usb: avoid length underflow in at76_guess_freq() at76_guess_freq() checks only that the received frame is at least a bare 802.11 header (24 bytes) before subtracting the fixed management-body offset: len -= el_off; For both beacon and probe response frames, el_off is 36. If the frame is shorter than el_off, subtracting it causes the calculated IE length to wrap. The length is eventually passed to cfg80211_find_elem_match() as a very large unsigned value, so the element walk runs beyond the RX skb. This path is reached from at76_rx_tasklet() while scanning. If the device delivers a truncated beacon or probe response, the oversized IE length causes an out-of-bounds read during scanning. Skip the IE lookup if the frame does not reach the variable elements, before subtracting el_off.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: at76c50x-usb: avoid length underflow in at76_guess_freq() at76_guess_freq() checks only that the received frame is at least a bare 802.11 header (24 bytes) before subtracting the fixed management-body offset: len -= el_off; For both beacon and probe response frames, el_off is 36. If the frame is shorter than el_off, subtracting it causes the calculated IE length to wrap. The length is eventually passed to cfg80211_find_elem_match() as a very large unsigned value, so the element walk runs beyond the RX skb. This path is reached from at76_rx_tasklet() while scanning. If the device delivers a truncated beacon or probe response, the oversized IE length causes an out-of-bounds read during scanning. Skip the IE lookup if the frame does not reach the variable elements, before subtracting el_off.
wifi: at76c50x-usb: avoid length underflow in at76_guess_freq()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: at76c50x-usb: avoid length underflow in at76_guess_freq() at76_guess_freq() checks only that the received frame is at least a bare 802.11 header (24 bytes) before subtracting the fixed management-body offset: len -= el_off; For both beacon and probe response frames, el_off is 36. If the frame is shorter than el_off, subtracting it causes the calculated IE length to wrap. The length is eventually passed to cfg80211_find_elem_match() as a very large unsigned value, so the element walk runs beyond the RX skb. This path is reached from at76_rx_tasklet() while scanning. If the device delivers a truncated beacon or probe response, the oversized IE length causes an out-of-bounds read during scanning. Skip the IE lookup if the frame does not reach the variable elements, before subtracting el_off.
EPSS