Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC reference to the main program fixups.c:jit_subprogs() rewrites BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads to contain real function addresses. This function is invoked from bpf_jit_subprogs() only when env->subprog_cnt > 1. Meaning that for any program like below: int main(void *ctx) { void *ptr = main; ... bpf_timer_set_callback(..., ptr); ... } The 'ptr' won't be ever converted to contain an address. In combination with e.g. bpf_timer_set_callback() this would lead to a function call at a bogus address. Instead of complicating the implementation, just assume that no useful program needs main to be a sync or async callback and reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads for the main subprogram.
Пакеты
| Пакет | Статус | Версия исправления | Релиз | Тип |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| linux | fixed | 7.2.7-1 | package |
Примечания
https://git.kernel.org/linus/374b2c5561db80fcdd7cdce44af37a49416f61c7 (7.3-rc2)
EPSS
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC reference to the main program fixups.c:jit_subprogs() rewrites BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads to contain real function addresses. This function is invoked from bpf_jit_subprogs() only when env->subprog_cnt > 1. Meaning that for any program like below: int main(void *ctx) { void *ptr = main; ... bpf_timer_set_callback(..., ptr); ... } The 'ptr' won't be ever converted to contain an address. In combination with e.g. bpf_timer_set_callback() this would lead to a function call at a bogus address. Instead of complicating the implementation, just assume that no useful program needs main to be a sync or async callback and reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads for the main subprogram.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC reference to the main program fixups.c:jit_subprogs() rewrites BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads to contain real function addresses. This function is invoked from bpf_jit_subprogs() only when env->subprog_cnt > 1. Meaning that for any program like below: int main(void *ctx) { void *ptr = main; ... bpf_timer_set_callback(..., ptr); ... } The 'ptr' won't be ever converted to contain an address. In combination with e.g. bpf_timer_set_callback() this would lead to a function call at a bogus address. Instead of complicating the implementation, just assume that no useful program needs main to be a sync or async callback and reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads for the main subprogram.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC reference to the main program fixups.c:jit_subprogs() rewrites BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads to contain real function addresses. This function is invoked from bpf_jit_subprogs() only when env->subprog_cnt > 1. Meaning that for any program like below: int main(void *ctx) { void *ptr = main; ... bpf_timer_set_callback(..., ptr); ... } The 'ptr' won't be ever converted to contain an address. In combination with e.g. bpf_timer_set_callback() this would lead to a function call at a bogus address. Instead of complicating the implementation, just assume that no useful program needs main to be a sync or async callback and reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads for the main subprogram.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC reference to the main program fixups.c:jit_subprogs() rewrites BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads to contain real function addresses. This function is invoked from bpf_jit_subprogs() only when env->subprog_cnt > 1. Meaning that for any program like below: int main(void *ctx) { void *ptr = main; ... bpf_timer_set_callback(..., ptr); ... } The 'ptr' won't be ever converted to contain an address. In combination with e.g. bpf_timer_set_callback() this would lead to a function call at a bogus address. Instead of complicating the implementation, just assume that no useful program needs main to be a sync or async callback and reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads for the main subprogram.
EPSS