Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix server->total_read for compound encrypted PDUs In receive_encrypted_standard(), server->total_read is left at the full decrypted frame size when walking sub-PDUs of a compound encrypted frame. As a result, cifs_handle_standard() passes this full size to smb2_check_message(), causing the PDU length guards to incorrectly validate the entire compound frame instead of the current sub-PDU. This allows truncated non-last sub-PDUs to bypass length validation, leading to out-of-bounds reads in smb2_get_data_area_len(). Fix this by setting server->total_read to the true length of the current sub-PDU: next_cmd for non-last sub-PDUs, and the remaining pdu_length for the last one.
Пакеты
| Пакет | Статус | Версия исправления | Релиз | Тип |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| linux | fixed | 7.2.8-1 | package |
Примечания
https://git.kernel.org/linus/f73726b83e4756fdaa099e1bc1143293bd57ad79 (7.3-rc4)
EPSS
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix server->total_read for compound encrypted PDUs In receive_encrypted_standard(), server->total_read is left at the full decrypted frame size when walking sub-PDUs of a compound encrypted frame. As a result, cifs_handle_standard() passes this full size to smb2_check_message(), causing the PDU length guards to incorrectly validate the entire compound frame instead of the current sub-PDU. This allows truncated non-last sub-PDUs to bypass length validation, leading to out-of-bounds reads in smb2_get_data_area_len(). Fix this by setting server->total_read to the true length of the current sub-PDU: next_cmd for non-last sub-PDUs, and the remaining pdu_length for the last one.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix server->total_read for compound encrypted PDUs In receive_encrypted_standard(), server->total_read is left at the full decrypted frame size when walking sub-PDUs of a compound encrypted frame. As a result, cifs_handle_standard() passes this full size to smb2_check_message(), causing the PDU length guards to incorrectly validate the entire compound frame instead of the current sub-PDU. This allows truncated non-last sub-PDUs to bypass length validation, leading to out-of-bounds reads in smb2_get_data_area_len(). Fix this by setting server->total_read to the true length of the current sub-PDU: next_cmd for non-last sub-PDUs, and the remaining pdu_length for the last one.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix server->total_read for compound encrypted PDUs In receive_encrypted_standard(), server->total_read is left at the full decrypted frame size when walking sub-PDUs of a compound encrypted frame. As a result, cifs_handle_standard() passes this full size to smb2_check_message(), causing the PDU length guards to incorrectly validate the entire compound frame instead of the current sub-PDU. This allows truncated non-last sub-PDUs to bypass length validation, leading to out-of-bounds reads in smb2_get_data_area_len(). Fix this by setting server->total_read to the true length of the current sub-PDU: next_cmd for non-last sub-PDUs, and the remaining pdu_length for the last one.
smb: client: fix server->total_read for compound encrypted PDUs
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix server->total_read for compound encrypted PDUs In receive_encrypted_standard(), server->total_read is left at the full decrypted frame size when walking sub-PDUs of a compound encrypted frame. As a result, cifs_handle_standard() passes this full size to smb2_check_message(), causing the PDU length guards to incorrectly validate the entire compound frame instead of the current sub-PDU. This allows truncated non-last sub-PDUs to bypass length validation, leading to out-of-bounds reads in smb2_get_data_area_len(). Fix this by setting server->total_read to the true length of the current sub-PDU: next_cmd for non-last sub-PDUs, and the remaining pdu_length for the last one.
EPSS