Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: usb: catc: bound the RX packet length in catc_rx_done() catc_rx_done() walks a multi-packet URB, reading a two-byte length from each packet header. Its bound, pkt_len > urb->actual_length, ignores the header offset and compares against the whole transfer rather than the bytes left from pkt_start, so a crafted packet header makes skb_copy_to_linear_data() read past the buffer. A length below ETH_HLEN is also accepted, including zero, and eth_type_trans() then reads a MAC header from the uninitialised tailroom of a shorter skb. The is_f5u011 branch takes its length straight from the transfer, so a zero-length URB reaches the same path. Track the bytes remaining from the current packet, and reject a header that does not fit, a length past what is left, and a length below an Ethernet header. A transfer shorter than an Ethernet header, including a zero-length one, previously became a runt skb passed to netif_rx() and counted as received; it is now counted in rx_length_errors and ends the walk.
Пакеты
| Пакет | Статус | Версия исправления | Релиз | Тип |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| linux | fixed | 7.2.9-1 | package | |
| linux | fixed | 6.12.113-1 | trixie | package |
| linux | fixed | 6.1.190-1 | bookworm | package |
Примечания
https://git.kernel.org/linus/9d565b6b72fe3f41fd43636e143072848105189f (7.3-rc5)
EPSS
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: usb: catc: bound the RX packet length in catc_rx_done() catc_rx_done() walks a multi-packet URB, reading a two-byte length from each packet header. Its bound, pkt_len > urb->actual_length, ignores the header offset and compares against the whole transfer rather than the bytes left from pkt_start, so a crafted packet header makes skb_copy_to_linear_data() read past the buffer. A length below ETH_HLEN is also accepted, including zero, and eth_type_trans() then reads a MAC header from the uninitialised tailroom of a shorter skb. The is_f5u011 branch takes its length straight from the transfer, so a zero-length URB reaches the same path. Track the bytes remaining from the current packet, and reject a header that does not fit, a length past what is left, and a length below an Ethernet header. A transfer shorter than an Ethernet header, including a zero-length one, previously became a runt skb passed to netif_rx() an...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: usb: catc: bound the RX packet length in catc_rx_done() catc_rx_done() walks a multi-packet URB, reading a two-byte length from each packet header. Its bound, pkt_len > urb->actual_length, ignores the header offset and compares against the whole transfer rather than the bytes left from pkt_start, so a crafted packet header makes skb_copy_to_linear_data() read past the buffer. A length below ETH_HLEN is also accepted, including zero, and eth_type_trans() then reads a MAC header from the uninitialised tailroom of a shorter skb. The is_f5u011 branch takes its length straight from the transfer, so a zero-length URB reaches the same path. Track the bytes remaining from the current packet, and reject a header that does not fit, a length past what is left, and a length below an Ethernet header. A transfer shorter than an Ethernet header, including a zero-length one, previously became a runt skb passed to netif_rx() an...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: usb: catc: bound the RX packet length in catc_rx_done() catc_rx_done() walks a multi-packet URB, reading a two-byte length from each packet header. Its bound, pkt_len > urb->actual_length, ignores the header offset and compares against the whole transfer rather than the bytes left from pkt_start, so a crafted packet header makes skb_copy_to_linear_data() read past the buffer. A length below ETH_HLEN is also accepted, including zero, and eth_type_trans() then reads a MAC header from the uninitialised tailroom of a shorter skb. The is_f5u011 branch takes its length straight from the transfer, so a zero-length URB reaches the same path. Track the bytes remaining from the current packet, and reject a header that does not fit, a length past what is left, and a length below an Ethernet header. A transfer shorter than an Ethernet header, including a zero-length one, previously became a runt skb passed to netif_rx()
net: usb: catc: bound the RX packet length in catc_rx_done()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: usb: catc: bound the RX packet length in catc_rx_done() catc_rx_done() walks a multi-packet URB, reading a two-byte length from each packet header. Its bound, pkt_len > urb->actual_length, ignores the header offset and compares against the whole transfer rather than the bytes left from pkt_start, so a crafted packet header makes skb_copy_to_linear_data() read past the buffer. A length below ETH_HLEN is also accepted, including zero, and eth_type_trans() then reads a MAC header from the uninitialised tailroom of a shorter skb. The is_f5u011 branch takes its length straight from the transfer, so a zero-length URB reaches the same path. Track the bytes remaining from the current packet, and reject a header that does not fit, a length past what is left, and a length below an Ethernet header. A transfer shorter than an Ethernet header, including a zero-length one, previously became a runt skb passed to netif_rx...
EPSS