Описание
Уязвимость в компонента netfilter ядра операционной системы Linux связана с неправильной проверкой входных данных. Эксплуатация уязвимости может позволить нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании
Вендор
Наименование ПО
Версия ПО
Тип ПО
Операционные системы и аппаратные платформы
Уровень опасности уязвимости
Возможные меры по устранению уязвимости
Статус уязвимости
Наличие эксплойта
Информация об устранении
Ссылки на источники
Идентификаторы других систем описаний уязвимостей
- CVE
EPSS
5.5 Medium
CVSS3
4.6 Medium
CVSS2
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: complete validation of user input In my recent commit, I missed that do_replace() handlers use copy_from_sockptr() (which I fixed), followed by unsafe copy_from_sockptr_offset() calls. In all functions, we can perform the @optlen validation before even calling xt_alloc_table_info() with the following check: if ((u64)optlen < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp)) return -EINVAL;
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: complete validation of user input In my recent commit, I missed that do_replace() handlers use copy_from_sockptr() (which I fixed), followed by unsafe copy_from_sockptr_offset() calls. In all functions, we can perform the @optlen validation before even calling xt_alloc_table_info() with the following check: if ((u64)optlen < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp)) return -EINVAL;
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: complete validation of user input In my recent commit, I missed that do_replace() handlers use copy_from_sockptr() (which I fixed), followed by unsafe copy_from_sockptr_offset() calls. In all functions, we can perform the @optlen validation before even calling xt_alloc_table_info() with the following check: if ((u64)optlen < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp)) return -EINVAL;
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: n ...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: complete validation of user input In my recent commit, I missed that do_replace() handlers use copy_from_sockptr() (which I fixed), followed by unsafe copy_from_sockptr_offset() calls. In all functions, we can perform the @optlen validation before even calling xt_alloc_table_info() with the following check: if ((u64)optlen < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp)) return -EINVAL;
EPSS
5.5 Medium
CVSS3
4.6 Medium
CVSS2