Описание
Уязвимость функции btrfs_finish_extent_commit() модуля fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c файловой системы btrfs ядра операционной системы Linux связана с ошибками синхронизации. Эксплуатация уязвимости может позволить нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании
Вендор
Наименование ПО
Версия ПО
Тип ПО
Операционные системы и аппаратные платформы
Уровень опасности уязвимости
Возможные меры по устранению уязвимости
Статус уязвимости
Наличие эксплойта
Информация об устранении
Ссылки на источники
Идентификаторы других систем описаний уязвимостей
- CVE
EPSS
5.5 Medium
CVSS3
4.6 Medium
CVSS2
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: harden block_group::bg_list against list_del() races As far as I can tell, these calls of list_del_init() on bg_list cannot run concurrently with btrfs_mark_bg_unused() or btrfs_mark_bg_to_reclaim(), as they are in transaction error paths and situations where the block group is readonly. However, if there is any chance at all of racing with mark_bg_unused(), or a different future user of bg_list, better to be safe than sorry. Otherwise we risk the following interleaving (bg_list refcount in parens) T1 (some random op) T2 (btrfs_mark_bg_unused) !list_empty(&bg->bg_list); (1) list_del_init(&bg->bg_list); (1) list_move_tail (1) btrfs_put_block_group (0) btrfs_delete_unused_bgs bg = list_first_entry list_del_init(&bg->bg_list); btrfs_put_block_group(bg); (-1) Ultimately, this results in a broken ref count that hits zero one deref early and the real final deref underflows the refcount, result...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: harden block_group::bg_list against list_del() races As far as I can tell, these calls of list_del_init() on bg_list cannot run concurrently with btrfs_mark_bg_unused() or btrfs_mark_bg_to_reclaim(), as they are in transaction error paths and situations where the block group is readonly. However, if there is any chance at all of racing with mark_bg_unused(), or a different future user of bg_list, better to be safe than sorry. Otherwise we risk the following interleaving (bg_list refcount in parens) T1 (some random op) T2 (btrfs_mark_bg_unused) !list_empty(&bg->bg_list); (1) list_del_init(&bg->bg_list); (1) list_move_tail (1) btrfs_put_block_group (0) btrfs_delete_unused_bgs bg = list_first_entry list_del_init(&bg->bg_list); btrfs_put_block_group(bg); (-1) Ultimately, this results in a broken ref count that hits zero one deref early and the real final deref underflows the refcount, result...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: harden block_group::bg_list against list_del() races As far as I can tell, these calls of list_del_init() on bg_list cannot run concurrently with btrfs_mark_bg_unused() or btrfs_mark_bg_to_reclaim(), as they are in transaction error paths and situations where the block group is readonly. However, if there is any chance at all of racing with mark_bg_unused(), or a different future user of bg_list, better to be safe than sorry. Otherwise we risk the following interleaving (bg_list refcount in parens) T1 (some random op) T2 (btrfs_mark_bg_unused) !list_empty(&bg->bg_list); (1) list_del_init(&bg->bg_list); (1) list_move_tail (1) btrfs_put_block_group (0) btrfs_delete_unused_bgs bg = list_first_entry
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: b ...
EPSS
5.5 Medium
CVSS3
4.6 Medium
CVSS2