Описание
Уязвимость функции nextstate() компонента gpsd/packet.c демона отслеживания приемников GPS GPSd связана с целочисленной потерей значимости. Эксплуатация уязвимости может позволить нарушителю, действующему удаленно, вызвать отказ в обслуживании
Вендор
Наименование ПО
Версия ПО
Тип ПО
Операционные системы и аппаратные платформы
Уровень опасности уязвимости
Возможные меры по устранению уязвимости
Статус уязвимости
Наличие эксплойта
Информация об устранении
Ссылки на источники
Идентификаторы других систем описаний уязвимостей
- CVE
EPSS
7.5 High
CVSS3
7.8 High
CVSS2
Связанные уязвимости
An integer underflow vulnerability exists in the `nextstate()` function in `gpsd/packet.c` of gpsd versions prior to commit `ffa1d6f40bca0b035fc7f5e563160ebb67199da7`. When parsing a NAVCOM packet, the payload length is calculated using `lexer->length = (size_t)c - 4` without checking if the input byte `c` is less than 4. This results in an unsigned integer underflow, setting `lexer->length` to a very large value (near `SIZE_MAX`). The parser then enters a loop attempting to consume this massive number of bytes, causing 100% CPU utilization and a Denial of Service (DoS) condition.
An integer underflow vulnerability exists in the `nextstate()` function in `gpsd/packet.c` of gpsd versions prior to commit `ffa1d6f40bca0b035fc7f5e563160ebb67199da7`. When parsing a NAVCOM packet, the payload length is calculated using `lexer->length = (size_t)c - 4` without checking if the input byte `c` is less than 4. This results in an unsigned integer underflow, setting `lexer->length` to a very large value (near `SIZE_MAX`). The parser then enters a loop attempting to consume this massive number of bytes, causing 100% CPU utilization and a Denial of Service (DoS) condition.
An integer underflow vulnerability exists in the `nextstate()` function in `gpsd/packet.c` of gpsd versions prior to commit `ffa1d6f40bca0b035fc7f5e563160ebb67199da7`. When parsing a NAVCOM packet, the payload length is calculated using `lexer->length = (size_t)c - 4` without checking if the input byte `c` is less than 4. This results in an unsigned integer underflow, setting `lexer->length` to a very large value (near `SIZE_MAX`). The parser then enters a loop attempting to consume this massive number of bytes, causing 100% CPU utilization and a Denial of Service (DoS) condition.
An integer underflow vulnerability exists in the `nextstate()` functio ...
An integer underflow vulnerability exists in the `nextstate()` function in `gpsd/packet.c` of gpsd versions prior to commit `ffa1d6f40bca0b035fc7f5e563160ebb67199da7`. When parsing a NAVCOM packet, the payload length is calculated using `lexer->length = (size_t)c - 4` without checking if the input byte `c` is less than 4. This results in an unsigned integer underflow, setting `lexer->length` to a very large value (near `SIZE_MAX`). The parser then enters a loop attempting to consume this massive number of bytes, causing 100% CPU utilization and a Denial of Service (DoS) condition.
EPSS
7.5 High
CVSS3
7.8 High
CVSS2