Описание
Уязвимость функции compat_mtw_from_user() модуля net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c реализации сетевых функций ядра операционной системы Linux связана с некорректным вводом конфигурационных данных. Эксплуатация уязвимости может позволить нарушителю оказать воздействие на конфиденциальность, целостность и доступность защищаемой информации
Вендор
Наименование ПО
Версия ПО
Тип ПО
Операционные системы и аппаратные платформы
Уровень опасности уязвимости
Возможные меры по устранению уязвимости
Статус уязвимости
Наличие эксплойта
Информация об устранении
Ссылки на источники
Идентификаторы других систем описаний уязвимостей
- CVE
EPSS
7.8 High
CVSS3
6.8 Medium
CVSS2
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ebtables: fix OOB read in compat_mtw_from_user Luxiao Xu says: The function compat_mtw_from_user() converts ebtables extensions from 32-bit user structures to kernel native structures. However, it lacks proper validation of the user-supplied match_size/target_size. When certain extensions are processed, the kernel-side translation logic may perform memory accesses based on the extension's expected size. If the user provides a size smaller than what the extension requires, it results in an out-of-bounds read as reported by KASAN. This fix introduces a check to ensure match_size is at least as large as the extension's required compatsize. This covers matches, watchers, and targets, while maintaining compatibility with standard targets. AFAIU this is relevant for matches that need to go though match->compat_from_user() call. Those that use plain memcpy with the user-provided size are ok because the caller c...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ebtables: fix OOB read in compat_mtw_from_user Luxiao Xu says: The function compat_mtw_from_user() converts ebtables extensions from 32-bit user structures to kernel native structures. However, it lacks proper validation of the user-supplied match_size/target_size. When certain extensions are processed, the kernel-side translation logic may perform memory accesses based on the extension's expected size. If the user provides a size smaller than what the extension requires, it results in an out-of-bounds read as reported by KASAN. This fix introduces a check to ensure match_size is at least as large as the extension's required compatsize. This covers matches, watchers, and targets, while maintaining compatibility with standard targets. AFAIU this is relevant for matches that need to go though match->compat_from_user() call. Those that use plain memcpy with the user-provided size are ok because the caller c...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ebtables: fix OOB read in compat_mtw_from_user Luxiao Xu says: The function compat_mtw_from_user() converts ebtables extensions from 32-bit user structures to kernel native structures. However, it lacks proper validation of the user-supplied match_size/target_size. When certain extensions are processed, the kernel-side translation logic may perform memory accesses based on the extension's expected size. If the user provides a size smaller than what the extension requires, it results in an out-of-bounds read as reported by KASAN. This fix introduces a check to ensure match_size is at least as large as the extension's required compatsize. This covers matches, watchers, and targets, while maintaining compatibility with standard targets. AFAIU this is relevant for matches that need to go though match->compat_from_user() call. Those that use plain memcpy with the user-provided size are ok because
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: n ...
EPSS
7.8 High
CVSS3
6.8 Medium
CVSS2