Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: tls: fix off-by-one in sg_chain entry count for wrapped sk_msg ring
When an sk_msg scatterlist ring wraps (sg.end < sg.start), tls_push_record() chains the tail portion of the ring to the head using sg_chain(). An extra entry in the sg array is reserved for this:
struct sk_msg_sg { [...] /* The extra two elements: * 1) used for chaining the front and sections when the list becomes * partitioned (e.g. end < start). The crypto APIs require the * chaining; * 2) to chain tailer SG entries after the message. */ struct scatterlist data[MAX_MSG_FRAGS + 2];
The current code uses MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1 as the ring size:
This places the chain pointer at
sg_chain(data[start], (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_star...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: tls: fix off-by-one in sg_chain entry count for wrapped sk_msg ring
When an sk_msg scatterlist ring wraps (sg.end < sg.start), tls_push_record() chains the tail portion of the ring to the head using sg_chain(). An extra entry in the sg array is reserved for this:
struct sk_msg_sg { [...] /* The extra two elements: * 1) used for chaining the front and sections when the list becomes * partitioned (e.g. end < start). The crypto APIs require the * chaining; * 2) to chain tailer SG entries after the message. */ struct scatterlist data[MAX_MSG_FRAGS + 2];
The current code uses MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1 as the ring size:
This places the chain pointer at
sg_chain(data[start], (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_start + 1) .. = &data[start] + (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_start + 1) - 1 = data[start + (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - start + 1) - 1] = data[MAX_SKB_FRAGS]
instead of the true last entry. This is likely due to a "race" of the commit under Fixes landing close to commit 031097d9e079 ("bpf: sk_msg, zap ingress queue on psock down")
Convert to ARRAY_SIZE and drop the data[start] / - start (as suggested by Sabrina).
Ссылки
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64047
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/131ef12057d92b77b636321b7849c69222405a97
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/285943c6e7ca309bbea84b253745154241d9788a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2fb0dc7e0099686c4e9d2732745d8a31b18c3628
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47110c3a9ac247b688657337f5981efcfcb240dc
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/66339b71f105e6f83e0da3b9583d95077534fe1d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/73963a375885d5ccb7def39fd0b4f542e0f343dd
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84158c2997159df4a0d70cd9c46774512d32a522
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eca989eab4b2599dcb02f72140a7c08f08838520
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: tls: fix off-by-one in sg_chain entry count for wrapped sk_msg ring When an sk_msg scatterlist ring wraps (sg.end < sg.start), tls_push_record() chains the tail portion of the ring to the head using sg_chain(). An extra entry in the sg array is reserved for this: struct sk_msg_sg { [...] /* The extra two elements: * 1) used for chaining the front and sections when the list becomes * partitioned (e.g. end < start). The crypto APIs require the * chaining; * 2) to chain tailer SG entries after the message. */ struct scatterlist data[MAX_MSG_FRAGS + 2]; The current code uses MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1 as the ring size: sg_chain(&msg_pl->sg.data[msg_pl->sg.start], MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_pl->sg.start + 1, msg_pl->sg.data); This places the chain pointer at sg_chain(data[start], (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_start + 1) .. = &data[start] + (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_start + 1) - 1 = data[start + (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - start + 1) - 1]...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: tls: fix off-by-one in sg_chain entry count for wrapped sk_msg ring When an sk_msg scatterlist ring wraps (sg.end < sg.start), tls_push_record() chains the tail portion of the ring to the head using sg_chain(). An extra entry in the sg array is reserved for this: struct sk_msg_sg { [...] /* The extra two elements: * 1) used for chaining the front and sections when the list becomes * partitioned (e.g. end < start). The crypto APIs require the * chaining; * 2) to chain tailer SG entries after the message. */ struct scatterlist data[MAX_MSG_FRAGS + 2]; The current code uses MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1 as the ring size: sg_chain(&msg_pl->sg.data[msg_pl->sg.start], MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_pl->sg.start + 1, msg_pl->sg.data); This places the chain pointer at sg_chain(data[start], (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_start + 1) .. = &data[start] + (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_start + 1) - 1 = data[start + (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - start + 1) - 1]...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: tls: fix off-by-one in sg_chain entry count for wrapped sk_msg ring When an sk_msg scatterlist ring wraps (sg.end < sg.start), tls_push_record() chains the tail portion of the ring to the head using sg_chain(). An extra entry in the sg array is reserved for this: struct sk_msg_sg { [...] /* The extra two elements: * 1) used for chaining the front and sections when the list becomes * partitioned (e.g. end < start). The crypto APIs require the * chaining; * 2) to chain tailer SG entries after the message. */ struct scatterlist data[MAX_MSG_FRAGS + 2]; The current code uses MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1 as the ring size: sg_chain(&msg_pl->sg.data[msg_pl->sg.start], MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_pl->sg.start + 1, msg_pl->sg.data); This places the chain pointer at sg_chain(data[start], (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_start +
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: n ...