GHSA-2mg4-pfgx-64cf

Описание

Summary

The verifyTokenSocket() function in plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php has its token timeout validation commented out, causing WebSocket tokens to never expire despite being generated with a 12-hour timeout. This allows captured or legitimately obtained tokens to provide permanent WebSocket access, even after user accounts are deleted, banned, or demoted from admin. Admin tokens grant access to real-time connection data for all online users including IP addresses, browser info, and page locations.

Details

WebSocket tokens are generated via getEncryptedInfo() which calls getToken(43200) to create a token with a 12-hour expiration window. The token is encrypted and contains security-critical claims: isAdmin, from_users_id, user_name, IP, browser, and device ID.

The regular HTTP token verification at objects/functions.php:3437-3439 enforces the timeout:

But the WebSocket-specific verification at plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php:65-82 has the enforcement commented out:

Execution flow:

1. Client connects to WebSocket with ?webSocketToken=TOKEN in URL query
2. onOpen() (Message.php:34) calls getDecryptedInfo($wsocketGetVars['webSocketToken']) (line 48)
3. getDecryptedInfo() (functions.php:49) decrypts the token and calls verifyTokenSocket($json->token) (line 54)
4. verifyTokenSocket() validates the salt (passes) but the timeout check at line 77 evaluates the condition without acting on failure — return false is commented out
5. Function returns true — connection established with all token claims (isAdmin, from_users_id) trusted

Impact amplification via isAdmin:

When a connection has isAdmin=true (from token, Message.php:58), the getTotals() function (Message.php:419-432) includes detailed data about every connected client in periodic broadcast messages:

Additionally, the webSocketToken message type (Message.php:212-217) allows anonymous connections (users_id=0) to upgrade their identity by providing a captured token, meaning stolen tokens work from new connections indefinitely.

The 10-minute inactivity timeout (Message.php:135-143) is not a mitigation — it only closes idle connections and resets on every message (line 243).

PoC

Scenario: Demoted admin retains permanent admin WebSocket access

1. Admin user obtains WebSocket token (contains isAdmin: true)
2. Admin is demoted to regular user via the web interface
3. Admin's WebSocket token still works indefinitely — the isAdmin claim in the token is never re-validated
4. Demoted user continues receiving all connected users' IPs, locations, and browsing activity

Impact

• Permanent access after credential revocation: Deleted, banned, or suspended users retain WebSocket access with their original identity and privilege level, undermining account lifecycle management.
• Privilege persistence after demotion: Admin users who are demoted retain admin-level WebSocket access indefinitely. The isAdmin flag baked into the token is never re-checked against the database.
• Real-time surveillance via admin tokens: Admin-level tokens expose all connected users' IP addresses, geographic locations (if User_location plugin enabled), current page URLs (selfURI), browser fingerprints, and device IDs — enabling real-time tracking of user activity.
• Extended attack window for token theft: Any vulnerability that leaks a WebSocket token (XSS, log exposure, network interception) provides permanent rather than 12-hour access, significantly increasing the impact of token compromise.
• Identity hijacking: The webSocketToken message type allows using a stolen token to assume another user's identity on new connections, enabling impersonation in chat and messaging.

Recommended Fix

Uncomment the timeout enforcement in verifyTokenSocket() at plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php:77-80:

Additionally, consider:

1. Adding an admin check to the getClientsList handler (Message.php:219) so only admins can enumerate connected users.
2. Re-validating the isAdmin claim against the database periodically rather than trusting the token claim for the lifetime of the connection.