GHSA-363v-5rh8-23wg

Описание

Summary

AVideo allows content owners to password-protect individual videos. The video password is stored in the database in plaintext — no hashing, salting, or encryption is applied. If an attacker gains read access to the database (via SQL injection, a database backup, or misconfigured access controls), they obtain all video passwords in cleartext.

Details

File: objects/video.php

Vulnerable setter:

Vulnerable getter:

The value assigned to $this->video_password is only trim()-ed before being persisted to the database column video_password in the videos table. There is no call to any hashing function (e.g., password_hash(), sha256, or similar).

When a visitor enters a password to access a protected video, the comparison is done directly against the stored plaintext:

This means:

1. Any database read (SQL injection, backup leak, hosting panel access) exposes all video passwords as cleartext.
2. Video passwords are often reused by users across other services, making this a credential harvesting risk.
3. The plaintext value is also present in application memory and any query logs.

PoC

1. Set a password on any video via the AVideo admin/creator UI.
2. Query the database: SELECT clean_title, video_password FROM videos WHERE video_password != '';
3. All video passwords are returned in plaintext — no cracking required.

Alternatively, exploit any of the SQL injection vulnerabilities already reported in this repository to extract the video_password column directly.

Impact

• Type: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information (CWE-312)
• Severity: High
• Authentication required: No — any database read access (including via SQL injection by unauthenticated users) exposes all passwords
• Impact: Full exposure of all video access passwords; credential reuse attacks against users who share passwords across services
• Fix: Hash video passwords on write using password_hash($video_password, PASSWORD_BCRYPT) and verify on read using password_verify($_POST['password'], $stored_hash)