Описание
@hapi/content header parser has a parameter smuggling issue that allows upload-filter bypass via duplicate parameters
Impact
The two parsers resolved duplicates inconsistently and silently:
Content.disposition()retained the last occurrence of each parameter.Content.type()retained the first occurrence of charset and boundary.
Either behavior creates a parameter-smuggling primitive when another component in the request-processing chain (a WAF, reverse proxy, security filter, or alternate parser) resolves duplicates the opposite way. The primary attack vector is upload filename allowlist bypass:
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="safe.txt"; filename="shell.php"
Patches
The issue has been patched in 6.0.2.
Workarounds
Pre or post validate headers looking for duplicates.
Resources
Пакеты
@hapi/content
< 6.0.2
6.0.2
Связанные уязвимости
@hapi/content provided HTTP Content-* headers parsing. Prior to 6.0.2, Content.disposition() retained the last occurrence of each duplicate parameter while Content.type() retained the first occurrence of duplicate charset and boundary parameters, creating a parameter-smuggling primitive when another component in the request-processing chain resolves duplicates the opposite way. This can allow an upload filename allowlist bypass in headers such as Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="safe.txt"; filename="shell.php". This issue is fixed in version 6.0.2.