Описание
An SSTI (Server-Side Template Injection) vulnerability exists in the get_address_display method of Frappe ERPNext through 15.89.0. This function renders address templates using frappe.render_template() with a context derived from the address_dict parameter, which can be either a dictionary or a string referencing an Address document. Although ERPNext uses a custom Jinja2 SandboxedEnvironment, dangerous functions like frappe.db.sql remain accessible via get_safe_globals(). An authenticated attacker with permission to create or modify an Address Template can inject arbitrary Jinja expressions into the template field. By creating an Address document with a matching country, and then calling the get_address_display API with address_dict="address_name", the system will render the malicious template using attacker-controlled data. This leads to server-side code execution or database information disclosure.
An SSTI (Server-Side Template Injection) vulnerability exists in the get_address_display method of Frappe ERPNext through 15.89.0. This function renders address templates using frappe.render_template() with a context derived from the address_dict parameter, which can be either a dictionary or a string referencing an Address document. Although ERPNext uses a custom Jinja2 SandboxedEnvironment, dangerous functions like frappe.db.sql remain accessible via get_safe_globals(). An authenticated attacker with permission to create or modify an Address Template can inject arbitrary Jinja expressions into the template field. By creating an Address document with a matching country, and then calling the get_address_display API with address_dict="address_name", the system will render the malicious template using attacker-controlled data. This leads to server-side code execution or database information disclosure.
Связанные уязвимости
An SSTI (Server-Side Template Injection) vulnerability exists in the get_address_display method of Frappe ERPNext through 15.89.0. This function renders address templates using frappe.render_template() with a context derived from the address_dict parameter, which can be either a dictionary or a string referencing an Address document. Although ERPNext uses a custom Jinja2 SandboxedEnvironment, dangerous functions like frappe.db.sql remain accessible via get_safe_globals(). An authenticated attacker with permission to create or modify an Address Template can inject arbitrary Jinja expressions into the template field. By creating an Address document with a matching country, and then calling the get_address_display API with address_dict="address_name", the system will render the malicious template using attacker-controlled data. This leads to server-side code execution or database information disclosure.