Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
orangefs: keep the readdir entry size 64-bit in fill_from_part()
fill_from_part() computes the size of a directory entry in size_t but stores it in a __u32. An entry length near U32_MAX wraps it to a small value, bypasses the bounds check, and is then used to index the entry, reading far past the directory part -- an out-of-bounds read that oopses the kernel.
Compute the size as a u64 so it cannot truncate; the bounds check then rejects the entry. The trailer is supplied by the userspace client.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
orangefs: keep the readdir entry size 64-bit in fill_from_part()
fill_from_part() computes the size of a directory entry in size_t but stores it in a __u32. An entry length near U32_MAX wraps it to a small value, bypasses the bounds check, and is then used to index the entry, reading far past the directory part -- an out-of-bounds read that oopses the kernel.
Compute the size as a u64 so it cannot truncate; the bounds check then rejects the entry. The trailer is supplied by the userspace client.
Ссылки
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72033
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07c05601a9a8e5d4481b2a4a16dc0e3c5bc63ad9
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1679780f482feeb82acb5995587d4fb1d1fe82fd
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/18227a6bc98bd0ba96ed3ce9d5b28776a5a28dfc
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/36723b28e3293047f087f4501f1ef4ead418dd84
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/82fc886e244c76fadf05ef1958aaf8815478ccde
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a72bbb43689591c9d36e3bb45c2d4e688cf92682
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e3d325c0bdb7bc5d1b4cc8d8441d79794cd03729
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fdf06a1b66ff39664b01c6bb6a2aa98d81e8ebe1
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: orangefs: keep the readdir entry size 64-bit in fill_from_part() fill_from_part() computes the size of a directory entry in size_t but stores it in a __u32. An entry length near U32_MAX wraps it to a small value, bypasses the bounds check, and is then used to index the entry, reading far past the directory part -- an out-of-bounds read that oopses the kernel. Compute the size as a u64 so it cannot truncate; the bounds check then rejects the entry. The trailer is supplied by the userspace client.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: orangefs: keep the readdir entry size 64-bit in fill_from_part() fill_from_part() computes the size of a directory entry in size_t but stores it in a __u32. An entry length near U32_MAX wraps it to a small value, bypasses the bounds check, and is then used to index the entry, reading far past the directory part -- an out-of-bounds read that oopses the kernel. Compute the size as a u64 so it cannot truncate; the bounds check then rejects the entry. The trailer is supplied by the userspace client.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: orangefs: keep the readdir entry size 64-bit in fill_from_part() fill_from_part() computes the size of a directory entry in size_t but stores it in a __u32. An entry length near U32_MAX wraps it to a small value, bypasses the bounds check, and is then used to index the entry, reading far past the directory part -- an out-of-bounds read that oopses the kernel. Compute the size as a u64 so it cannot truncate; the bounds check then rejects the entry. The trailer is supplied by the userspace client.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: o ...