Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
partitions: aix: bound the pp_count scan to the ppe array
aix_partition() reads the physical volume descriptor into a fixed-size struct pvd and then scans its physical-partition-extent array:
pvd points at a single kmalloc()'d struct pvd whose ppe[] member holds a fixed ARRAY_SIZE(pvd->ppe) (1016) entries, but the loop runs up to the on-disk pp_count. pp_count is an unvalidated __be16 read straight from the descriptor, so a crafted AIX image with pp_count larger than 1016 drives the loop to read pvd->ppe[i] past the end of the allocation (up to 65535 entries, ~2 MB out of bounds).
The partition scan runs without mounting anything, when a block device with a crafted AIX/IBM partition table appears (an attacker-supplied image attached with losetup -P, or a devic...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
partitions: aix: bound the pp_count scan to the ppe array
aix_partition() reads the physical volume descriptor into a fixed-size struct pvd and then scans its physical-partition-extent array:
pvd points at a single kmalloc()'d struct pvd whose ppe[] member holds a fixed ARRAY_SIZE(pvd->ppe) (1016) entries, but the loop runs up to the on-disk pp_count. pp_count is an unvalidated __be16 read straight from the descriptor, so a crafted AIX image with pp_count larger than 1016 drives the loop to read pvd->ppe[i] past the end of the allocation (up to 65535 entries, ~2 MB out of bounds).
The partition scan runs without mounting anything, when a block device with a crafted AIX/IBM partition table appears (an attacker-supplied image attached with losetup -P, or a device auto-scanned by udev), via msdos_partition() -> aix_partition().
Clamp the scan to the number of entries the ppe[] array can hold.
Ссылки
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64318
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/09861651617ba0fec089e8b9477439e68398c110
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2dc0bfd2fe355fb930de63c2f2eb8ced8570c579
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/44f37ee92fdcd377c41bdf6a31cdd8cc7d4c410e
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4671bb74bba05fdd4acf670a35758c29e8c97b83
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5eacdb1967378f5e5591cd27a2d8cdee2df1a599
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b5e9c09309e18fd9839ad007c238120353ca0cc4
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce93228e2193a17d2c58b656e439bb39fe5c3af8
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd94a779020f2ecc8b2607f4c20b34acb1763b9a
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: partitions: aix: bound the pp_count scan to the ppe array aix_partition() reads the physical volume descriptor into a fixed-size struct pvd and then scans its physical-partition-extent array: int numpps = be16_to_cpu(pvd->pp_count); ... for (i = 0; i < numpps; i += 1) { struct ppe *p = pvd->ppe + i; ... lp_ix = be16_to_cpu(p->lp_ix); pvd points at a single kmalloc()'d struct pvd whose ppe[] member holds a fixed ARRAY_SIZE(pvd->ppe) (1016) entries, but the loop runs up to the on-disk pp_count. pp_count is an unvalidated __be16 read straight from the descriptor, so a crafted AIX image with pp_count larger than 1016 drives the loop to read pvd->ppe[i] past the end of the allocation (up to 65535 entries, ~2 MB out of bounds). The partition scan runs without mounting anything, when a block device with a crafted AIX/IBM partition table appears (an attacker-supplied image attached with losetup -P, or a device auto-scanned...
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's AIX partition handling. A local attacker can provide a specially crafted AIX/IBM partition table on a block device. When the kernel scans this device, the `aix_partition()` function reads an unvalidated `pp_count` value, causing it to read beyond the allocated buffer. This out-of-bounds read can lead to information disclosure, potentially revealing sensitive kernel memory, and may also result in a denial of service.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: partitions: aix: bound the pp_count scan to the ppe array aix_partition() reads the physical volume descriptor into a fixed-size struct pvd and then scans its physical-partition-extent array: int numpps = be16_to_cpu(pvd->pp_count); ... for (i = 0; i < numpps; i += 1) { struct ppe *p = pvd->ppe + i; ... lp_ix = be16_to_cpu(p->lp_ix); pvd points at a single kmalloc()'d struct pvd whose ppe[] member holds a fixed ARRAY_SIZE(pvd->ppe) (1016) entries, but the loop runs up to the on-disk pp_count. pp_count is an unvalidated __be16 read straight from the descriptor, so a crafted AIX image with pp_count larger than 1016 drives the loop to read pvd->ppe[i] past the end of the allocation (up to 65535 entries, ~2 MB out of bounds). The partition scan runs without mounting anything, when a block device with a crafted AIX/IBM partition table appears (an attacker-supplied image attached with losetup -P, or a device a
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: p ...