Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/dasd: Fix undersized format-check buffer
fmt_buffer_size in dasd_eckd_check_device_format() is declared as int, even though one of the multiplicands, sizeof(struct eckd_count), is a size_t. The expression
is therefore correctly evaluated at 64-bit width, but the result is silently truncated when it is stored back into the 32-bit fmt_buffer_size variable. For a sufficiently large track range (start_unit/stop_unit are caller-controlled) this truncation yields a buffer size far smaller than the number of tracks actually requested. kzalloc() then succeeds with an undersized allocation, while the subsequent channel program build still operates on the untruncated track count and writes past the end of that buffer.
Compute the buffer size with check_mul_overflow() and keep it in a size_t, so that a value that no longer fits results in -EINVAL instead of a silentl...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/dasd: Fix undersized format-check buffer
fmt_buffer_size in dasd_eckd_check_device_format() is declared as int, even though one of the multiplicands, sizeof(struct eckd_count), is a size_t. The expression
is therefore correctly evaluated at 64-bit width, but the result is silently truncated when it is stored back into the 32-bit fmt_buffer_size variable. For a sufficiently large track range (start_unit/stop_unit are caller-controlled) this truncation yields a buffer size far smaller than the number of tracks actually requested. kzalloc() then succeeds with an undersized allocation, while the subsequent channel program build still operates on the untruncated track count and writes past the end of that buffer.
Compute the buffer size with check_mul_overflow() and keep it in a size_t, so that a value that no longer fits results in -EINVAL instead of a silently truncated allocation size.
Ссылки
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80710
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f40b346462f563a0d6e841a77b5163d2a882a04
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/87f3389cd3920714c53e704778f7ca7f1cf0c39c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f88dda2f22927d22498801a92cab6a9424eaf86
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aca18289c86f22d3fc2f3f6ff615286e7b1702f6
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e16e0fc54120cee3c6f0362de95aab6792865857
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/dasd: Fix undersized format-check buffer fmt_buffer_size in dasd_eckd_check_device_format() is declared as int, even though one of the multiplicands, sizeof(struct eckd_count), is a size_t. The expression trkcount * rpt_max * sizeof(struct eckd_count) is therefore correctly evaluated at 64-bit width, but the result is silently truncated when it is stored back into the 32-bit fmt_buffer_size variable. For a sufficiently large track range (start_unit/stop_unit are caller-controlled) this truncation yields a buffer size far smaller than the number of tracks actually requested. kzalloc() then succeeds with an undersized allocation, while the subsequent channel program build still operates on the untruncated track count and writes past the end of that buffer. Compute the buffer size with check_mul_overflow() and keep it in a size_t, so that a value that no longer fits results in -EINVAL instead of a silently truncat...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/dasd: Fix undersized format-check buffer fmt_buffer_size in dasd_eckd_check_device_format() is declared as int, even though one of the multiplicands, sizeof(struct eckd_count), is a size_t. The expression trkcount * rpt_max * sizeof(struct eckd_count) is therefore correctly evaluated at 64-bit width, but the result is silently truncated when it is stored back into the 32-bit fmt_buffer_size variable. For a sufficiently large track range (start_unit/stop_unit are caller-controlled) this truncation yields a buffer size far smaller than the number of tracks actually requested. kzalloc() then succeeds with an undersized allocation, while the subsequent channel program build still operates on the untruncated track count and writes past the end of that buffer. Compute the buffer size with check_mul_overflow() and keep it in a size_t, so that a value that no longer fits results in -EINVAL instead of a silently truncat...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/dasd: Fix undersized format-check buffer fmt_buffer_size in dasd_eckd_check_device_format() is declared as int, even though one of the multiplicands, sizeof(struct eckd_count), is a size_t. The expression trkcount * rpt_max * sizeof(struct eckd_count) is therefore correctly evaluated at 64-bit width, but the result is silently truncated when it is stored back into the 32-bit fmt_buffer_size variable. For a sufficiently large track range (start_unit/stop_unit are caller-controlled) this truncation yields a buffer size far smaller than the number of tracks actually requested. kzalloc() then succeeds with an undersized allocation, while the subsequent channel program build still operates on the untruncated track count and writes past the end of that buffer. Compute the buffer size with check_mul_overflow() and keep it in a size_t, so that a value that no longer fits results in -EINVAL instead of a silently t
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s ...