Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter
On VMX, there are some balanced returns between the time the guest's SPEC_CTRL value is written, and the vmenter.
Balanced returns (matched by a preceding call) are usually ok, but it's at least theoretically possible an NMI with a deep call stack could empty the RSB before one of the returns.
For maximum paranoia, don't allow any returns (balanced or otherwise) between the SPEC_CTRL write and the vmenter.
[ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter
On VMX, there are some balanced returns between the time the guest's SPEC_CTRL value is written, and the vmenter.
Balanced returns (matched by a preceding call) are usually ok, but it's at least theoretically possible an NMI with a deep call stack could empty the RSB before one of the returns.
For maximum paranoia, don't allow any returns (balanced or otherwise) between the SPEC_CTRL write and the vmenter.
[ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ]
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter On VMX, there are some balanced returns between the time the guest's SPEC_CTRL value is written, and the vmenter. Balanced returns (matched by a preceding call) are usually ok, but it's at least theoretically possible an NMI with a deep call stack could empty the RSB before one of the returns. For maximum paranoia, don't allow *any* returns (balanced or otherwise) between the SPEC_CTRL write and the vmenter. [ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter On VMX, there are some balanced returns between the time the guest's SPEC_CTRL value is written, and the vmenter. Balanced returns (matched by a preceding call) are usually ok, but it's at least theoretically possible an NMI with a deep call stack could empty the RSB before one of the returns. For maximum paranoia, don't allow *any* returns (balanced or otherwise) between the SPEC_CTRL write and the vmenter. [ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter On VMX, there are some balanced returns between the time the guest's SPEC_CTRL value is written, and the vmenter. Balanced returns (matched by a preceding call) are usually ok, but it's at least theoretically possible an NMI with a deep call stack could empty the RSB before one of the returns. For maximum paranoia, don't allow *any* returns (balanced or otherwise) between the SPEC_CTRL write and the vmenter. [ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: K ...