GHSA-77g9-363w-rccq

Описание

Summary

mise's trust feature gates config files (mise.toml, .tool-versions) through trust_check, but task-include files are loaded on a path that never reaches it. When a directory has a task-include dir (mise-tasks/, .mise/tasks/, …) but no config file, mise falls back to the default includes and renders each task's tera fields — and that tera environment has exec() registered. A {{ exec(command='…') }} in any rendered field runs arbitrary commands the moment the tasks are merely listed. There's no config file to gate on, so no trust prompt ever appears. Read-only commands trigger it: mise tasks, mise task ls, mise run, mise tasks --usage (the query shell completion runs on Tab). The victim only has to cd into a cloned repo and list or tab-complete a task

Details

Trust is enforced only inside config-file parsing:

• src/config/config_file/mise_toml.rs:276 — MiseToml::from_str → trust_check(path)?
• src/config/config_file/tool_versions.rs:62 — .tool-versions parser → trust_check(&path)?
• src/config/env_directive/mod.rs:681 — env templates → trust_check(path)? (only when the value contains template syntax)

Task-include files are loaded by load_tasks_in_dir / load_local_tasks_with_context, which walk every directory from CWD up to root. For each directory, configs_at_root returns the parsed (trusted) configs rooted there; if there is no config in the directory, mise falls back to the default task-include list resolved relative to that directory and loads whatever it finds — with no trust check:

src/config/mod.rs (load_tasks_in_dir, ~2586):

default_task_includes() (src/config/mod.rs:1825):

load_task_file (src/config/mod.rs:2645) reads the TOML directly with no trust check and renders each task:

Task::render (src/task/mod.rs:1475) renders many fields through tera, and the tera instance is built with get_tera(Some(config_root)):

get_tera (src/tera.rs:407) registers the command-executing functions:

So a tera {{ exec(command='…') }} placed in any rendered task field (description, dir, shell, sources, aliases, depends, tools, …) of a TOML task file — or in a #MISE description="…" header of an executable script task (Task::from_path) — executes when the task is merely loaded for listing, with no trust prompt. exec() is not gated by experimental (default experimental = false).

Proof of concept

Tested against the prebuilt release binary, mise 2026.6.4 linux-x64, with a pristine HOME so nothing is pre-trusted.

Repo layout :

mise-tasks/ci.toml:

Trigger (any of these; a victim who has mise activate set up hits the last one by just pressing Tab to complete a task name):

output:

and the side effect :