Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: icmp: clear skb2->cb[] in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach()
Sashiko AI-review observed:
In ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(), the skb is an outer IPv4 ICMP error packet where its cb contains an IPv4 inet_skb_parm. When skb is cloned into skb2 and passed to icmp6_send(), it uses IP6CB(skb2).
IP6CB interprets the IPv4 inet_skb_parm as an inet6_skb_parm. The cipso offset in inet_skb_parm.opt directly overlaps with dsthao in inet6_skb_parm at offset 18.
If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv4 error with a CIPSO IP option, dsthao would be a non-zero offset. Inside icmp6_send(), mip6_addr_swap() is called and uses ipv6_find_tlv(skb, opt->dsthao, IPV6_TLV_HAO).
This would scan the inner, attacker-controlled IPv6 packet starting at that offset, potentially returning a fake TLV without checking if the remaining packet length can hold the full 18-byte struct ipv6_destopt_hao.
Could mip6_addr_swap() t...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: icmp: clear skb2->cb[] in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach()
Sashiko AI-review observed:
In ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(), the skb is an outer IPv4 ICMP error packet where its cb contains an IPv4 inet_skb_parm. When skb is cloned into skb2 and passed to icmp6_send(), it uses IP6CB(skb2).
IP6CB interprets the IPv4 inet_skb_parm as an inet6_skb_parm. The cipso offset in inet_skb_parm.opt directly overlaps with dsthao in inet6_skb_parm at offset 18.
If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv4 error with a CIPSO IP option, dsthao would be a non-zero offset. Inside icmp6_send(), mip6_addr_swap() is called and uses ipv6_find_tlv(skb, opt->dsthao, IPV6_TLV_HAO).
This would scan the inner, attacker-controlled IPv6 packet starting at that offset, potentially returning a fake TLV without checking if the remaining packet length can hold the full 18-byte struct ipv6_destopt_hao.
Could mip6_addr_swap() then perform a 16-byte swap that extends past the end of the packet data into skb_shared_info?
Should the cb array also be cleared in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() and ip6ip6_err() to prevent this?
This patch implements the first suggestion.
I am not sure if ip6ip6_err() needs to be changed. A separate patch would be better anyway.
Ссылки
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43038
- https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-43038.json
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e41953e7d118e2702bcb217879c173d9d1d3cd4e
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c438ba010171b70bad22fc18b1d5bdc3627476e8
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a4437faf135da293d16fcc4cc607316742bd0ebb
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a2edbb6393972a02114b6003953a5cef3104fada
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/86ab3e55673a7a49a841838776f1ab18d23a67b5
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d5127d998de617b130aae96b138dba22ac6a8a7
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1ceeebd5bd6d855b17a5df625109bfe29129d7cf
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0452b6526b2f54b2413b9cb4ff1ea2ac542c99c7
- https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-082556.html
- https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-019113.html
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2464397
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-43038
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30848
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30129
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:26535
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:25533
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:25121
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:25120
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24343
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:23237
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:23224
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22964
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22940
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22900
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: icmp: clear skb2->cb[] in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() Sashiko AI-review observed: In ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(), the skb is an outer IPv4 ICMP error packet where its cb contains an IPv4 inet_skb_parm. When skb is cloned into skb2 and passed to icmp6_send(), it uses IP6CB(skb2). IP6CB interprets the IPv4 inet_skb_parm as an inet6_skb_parm. The cipso offset in inet_skb_parm.opt directly overlaps with dsthao in inet6_skb_parm at offset 18. If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv4 error with a CIPSO IP option, dsthao would be a non-zero offset. Inside icmp6_send(), mip6_addr_swap() is called and uses ipv6_find_tlv(skb, opt->dsthao, IPV6_TLV_HAO). This would scan the inner, attacker-controlled IPv6 packet starting at that offset, potentially returning a fake TLV without checking if the remaining packet length can hold the full 18-byte struct ipv6_destopt_hao. Could mip6_addr_swap() then perform a 16-byte swap that e...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: icmp: clear skb2->cb[] in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() Sashiko AI-review observed: In ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(), the skb is an outer IPv4 ICMP error packet where its cb contains an IPv4 inet_skb_parm. When skb is cloned into skb2 and passed to icmp6_send(), it uses IP6CB(skb2). IP6CB interprets the IPv4 inet_skb_parm as an inet6_skb_parm. The cipso offset in inet_skb_parm.opt directly overlaps with dsthao in inet6_skb_parm at offset 18. If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv4 error with a CIPSO IP option, dsthao would be a non-zero offset. Inside icmp6_send(), mip6_addr_swap() is called and uses ipv6_find_tlv(skb, opt->dsthao, IPV6_TLV_HAO). This would scan the inner, attacker-controlled IPv6 packet starting at that offset, potentially returning a fake TLV without checking if the remaining packet length can hold the full 18-byte struct ipv6_destopt_hao. Could mip6_addr_swap() then perform a 16-byte swap that e...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: icmp: clear skb2->cb[] in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() Sashiko AI-review observed: In ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(), the skb is an outer IPv4 ICMP error packet where its cb contains an IPv4 inet_skb_parm. When skb is cloned into skb2 and passed to icmp6_send(), it uses IP6CB(skb2). IP6CB interprets the IPv4 inet_skb_parm as an inet6_skb_parm. The cipso offset in inet_skb_parm.opt directly overlaps with dsthao in inet6_skb_parm at offset 18. If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv4 error with a CIPSO IP option, dsthao would be a non-zero offset. Inside icmp6_send(), mip6_addr_swap() is called and uses ipv6_find_tlv(skb, opt->dsthao, IPV6_TLV_HAO). This would scan the inner, attacker-controlled IPv6 packet starting at that offset, potentially returning a fake TLV without checking if the remaining packet length can hold the full 18-byte struct ipv6_destopt_hao. Could mip6_addr_swap() then
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i ...
Уязвимость функции ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() модуля net/ipv6/icmp.c ядра операционной системы Linux, позволяющая нарушителю получить несанкционированный доступ к защищаемой информации или вызвать отказ в обслуживании