Описание
yt-dlp File system modification and RCE through improper file-extension sanitization
Summary
yt-dlp does not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). Since yt-dlp also reads config from the working directory (and on Windows executables will be executed from the yt-dlp directory) this could lead to arbitrary code being executed.
Patches
yt-dlp version 2024.07.01 fixes this issue by whitelisting the allowed extensions.
This means some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded; however, it will also limit the possible exploitation surface.
Workarounds
It is recommended to upgrade yt-dlp to version 2024.07.01 as soon as possible, always have .%(ext)s at the end of the output template, and make sure you trust the websites that you are downloading from. Also, make sure to never download to a directory within PATH or other sensitive locations like your user directory, system32, or other binaries locations.
For users not able to upgrade:
- Make sure the extension of the media to download is a common video/audio/sub/... one
- Try to avoid the generic extractor (
--ies default,-generic) - Keep the default output template (
-o "%(title)s [%(id)s].%(ext)s) - Omit any of the subtitle options (
--write-subs,--write-auto-subs,--all-subs,--write-srt) - Use
--ignore-config --config-location ...to not load config from common locations
Details
One potential exploitation might look like this:
From a mimetype we do not know, we default to trimming the leading bit and using the remainder. Given a webpage that contains
this will try and download a file called ffmpeg.exe (-o "%(title)s.%(ext)s).
ffmpeg.exe will be searched for in the current directory, and so upon the next run arbitrary code can be executed.
Alternatively, when engineering a file called yt-dlp.conf to be created, the config file could contain --exec ... and so would also execute arbitrary code.
Acknowledgement
A big thanks to @JarLob for independently finding a new application of the same underlying issue. More can be read about on the dedicated GitHub Security Lab disclosure here: Path traversal saving subtitles (GHSL-2024-090)
References
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a
- https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp
Ссылки
- https://github.com/dirkf/youtube-dl/security/advisories/GHSA-22fp-mf44-f2mq
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519
- https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/pull/32830
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a
- https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/commit/d42a222ed541b96649396ef00e19552aef0f09ec
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01
- https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-089_youtube-dl
- https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp
Пакеты
yt-dlp
< 2024.07.01
2024.07.01
Связанные уязвимости
`yt-dlp` and `youtube-dl` are command-line audio/video downloaders. Prior to the fixed versions, `yt-dlp` and `youtube-dl` do not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). Since `yt-dlp` and `youtube-dl` also read config from the working directory (and on Windows executables will be executed from the `yt-dlp` or `youtube-dl` directory), this could lead to arbitrary code being executed. `yt-dlp` version 2024.07.01 fixes this issue by whitelisting the allowed extensions. `youtube-dl` fixes this issue in commit `d42a222` on the `master` branch and in nightly builds tagged 2024-07-03 or later. This might mean some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded, however it will also limit the possible exploitation surface. In addition to upgrading, have `.%(ext)s` at the end of the output template and make sure the user trusts the websites that they are downloading from. Also...
`yt-dlp` and `youtube-dl` are command-line audio/video downloaders. Prior to the fixed versions, `yt-dlp` and `youtube-dl` do not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). Since `yt-dlp` and `youtube-dl` also read config from the working directory (and on Windows executables will be executed from the `yt-dlp` or `youtube-dl` directory), this could lead to arbitrary code being executed. `yt-dlp` version 2024.07.01 fixes this issue by whitelisting the allowed extensions. `youtube-dl` fixes this issue in commit `d42a222` on the `master` branch and in nightly builds tagged 2024-07-03 or later. This might mean some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded, however it will also limit the possible exploitation surface. In addition to upgrading, have `.%(ext)s` at the end of the output template and make sure the user trusts the websites that they are downloading from. Als
`yt-dlp` and `youtube-dl` are command-line audio/video downloaders. Pr ...