Описание
Trust Boundary Violation due to Incomplete Blacklist in Test Failure Processing in Ares
Impact
This allows an attacker to create special subclasses of InvocationTargetException that escape the exception sanitization because JUnit extracts the cause in a trusted context before the exception reaches Ares. This means that arbitrary student code can be executed in a trusted context, and that in turn allows disabling Ares and having full control over the system.
Patches
Update to version 1.7.6 or later.
Workarounds
Forbid student classes in trusted packages like, e.g., described in https://github.com/ls1intum/Ares/issues/15#issuecomment-996449371
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more? Not that I know of.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Open an issue in https://github.com/ls1intum/Ares/issues
- Email us, see https://github.com/ls1intum/Ares/security/policy
Detailed description
Using generics, it is possible to throw checked exceptions without a throws clause:
ThrowWithoutThrowsHelper
Using this, it is possible for a malicious testee to throw an instance of a malicious subclass of InvocationTargetException (let's call it EvilInvocationTargetException).
This exception is catched by org.junit.platform.commons.util.ReflectionUtils::invokeMethod, which looks like this:
ReflectionUtils::invokeMethod
This method calls getUnderlyingCause (of the same class), passing to it the catched, malicious exception as an argument.
ReflectionUtils::getUnderlyingCause
getUnderlyingCause in turn checks if the passed exception is instanceof InvocationTargetException, and if so, calls getTargetException on it. getTargetException can be overridden by subclasses of InvocationTargetException, like the EvilInvocationTargetException.
If EvilInvocationTargetException is in a whitelisted package (for example de.tum.in.test.api.security.notsealedsubpackage), getTargetException will be called with the entire stack containing only whitelisted frames.
This allows the attacker to uninstall the ArtemisSecurityManager in EvilInvocationTargetException::getTargetException:
Uninstalling ArtemisSecurityManager
After uninstalling ArtemisSecurityManager, the attacker is free to do anything expressible in Java; including reading and writing any files, opening network connections, and executing arbitrary shell commands.
Пакеты
de.tum.in.ase:artemis-java-test-sandbox
< 1.7.6
1.7.6
Связанные уязвимости
Artemis Java Test Sandbox versions less than 1.7.6 are vulnerable to a sandbox escape when an attacker crafts a special subclass of InvocationTargetException. An attacker can abuse this issue to execute arbitrary Java when a victim executes the supposedly sandboxed code.