Описание
Gogs has Path Traversal in organization name that results in RCE through Git hooks
Summary
Organization names containing path traversal sequences (../) are accepted by Gogs, and repositories under them are written to paths following these path traversals. This allows storing/retrieving data for repositories at arbitrary locations on the filesystem.
By creating nested structure of Git repositories, one can overwrite the other's hooks configuration to result in Remote Code Execution (RCE).
Details
During organization creation, internal/database/org.go calls os.MkdirAll(repox.UserPath(org.Name)) without sanitizing org.Name.
Repository creation uses this name to decide where to write the Git bare repository's (org/name.git). By setting the org name to ../../../../tmp/test, and creating a repository under that organization, it gets written under /tmp/test on the server.
An attacker can abuse this in a clever way by writing to the /data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1 directory, being a local worktree of the git repositories inside of Gogs. These directories are editable by Git. By creating a repository nested inside of there, files like config and hooks/update are now referenced through the path traversal, and are editable by Git. This allows the attacker to edit the hooks/update script with malicious Bash commands and then to trigger the hook.
The steps to exploit this inside of Gogs are roughly (ignoring some syncing dummy actions):
- Create regular outer repository and get its ID
- Create organization named
../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/{ID}/nested - Create a repository inside this organization (eg.
rce), which will be written into the local clone of the outer repository - From the outer repository, edit
nested/rce.git/hooks/updateto contain malicious shell commands - Interact with the
rcerepository again to trigger the updated hook, and RCE is achieved
PoC
- Set up a default Gogs instance by saving the following content to
docker-compose.ymland runningdocker compose up:
- Visit http://localhost:3000, set the Host to
db:5432and Password togogs. Under Admin Account Settings configure your admin account - As the attacker, register an account with username
attackerand passwordattackerat http://localhost:3000/user/sign_up - As the attacker, run the following script (in gist to avoid cluttering this advisory):
https://gist.github.com/JorianWoltjer/4b72063338b27140f4439c524d98f2b9
The output should look like:
Impact
In the default setting, users can self-register and then create their own organizations. From here they can perform this exploit to achieve RCE as the git user.
Пакеты
gogs.io/gogs
< 0.14.3
0.14.3
Связанные уязвимости
Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to 0.14.3, organization names containing path traversal sequences (../) are accepted by Gogs, and repositories under them are written to paths following these path traversals. This allows storing/retrieving data for repositories at arbitrary locations on the filesystem. By creating nested structure of Git repositories, one can overwrite the other's hooks configuration to result in Remote Code Execution (RCE). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.14.3.
Уязвимость функции internal/database/org.go программного средства создания самоуправляемых Git-репозиториев Gogs, позволяющая нарушителю выполнить произвольный код