Описание
In src/havegecmd.c, the socket_handler function performs a credential check on the abstract UNIX socket (\0/sys/entropy/haveged). However, while it detects if the connecting user is not root (cred.uid != 0) and prepares a negative acknowledgement (ASCII_NAK), it fails to stop execution. The code proceeds to the switch statement, allowing any local unprivileged user to execute privileged commands such as MAGIC_CHROOT.
In src/havegecmd.c, the socket_handler function performs a credential check on the abstract UNIX socket (\0/sys/entropy/haveged). However, while it detects if the connecting user is not root (cred.uid != 0) and prepares a negative acknowledgement (ASCII_NAK), it fails to stop execution. The code proceeds to the switch statement, allowing any local unprivileged user to execute privileged commands such as MAGIC_CHROOT.
Ссылки
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41054
- https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2026-41054
- https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2026/06/msg00005.html
- http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/19/3
- http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/19/4
- http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/19/5
- http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/20/1
- http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/21/17
- http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/22/1
Связанные уязвимости
In `src/havegecmd.c`, the `socket_handler` function performs a credential check on the abstract UNIX socket (`\0/sys/entropy/haveged`). However, while it detects if the connecting user is not root (`cred.uid != 0`) and prepares a negative acknowledgement (`ASCII_NAK`), it **fails to stop execution**. The code proceeds to the `switch` statement, allowing any local unprivileged user to execute privileged commands such as `MAGIC_CHROOT`.
In `src/havegecmd.c`, the `socket_handler` function performs a credential check on the abstract UNIX socket (`\0/sys/entropy/haveged`). However, while it detects if the connecting user is not root (`cred.uid != 0`) and prepares a negative acknowledgement (`ASCII_NAK`), it **fails to stop execution**. The code proceeds to the `switch` statement, allowing any local unprivileged user to execute privileged commands such as `MAGIC_CHROOT`.
Missing exit out of permission check in haveged could lead to root exploit
In `src/havegecmd.c`, the `socket_handler` function performs a credent ...
