Описание
Flyto2 Core: Guarded HTTP modules follow redirects into internal space without per-hop SSRF revalidation
Summary
The HTTP modules that DO call the SSRF guard (http.get, http.request, http.batch) validate only the initial URL, then issue the request with aiohttp's default allow_redirects=True and perform no per-hop revalidation. An attacker hosts a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address; the guard passes on the public host and aiohttp transparently follows the redirect into internal space, returning the internal body.
Root Cause
src/core/modules/atomic/http/get.py:116 calls session.get(url, ...) with no allow_redirects argument → aiohttp default True. request.py:60 sets allow_redirects=follow_redirects (default True at :327); batch.py:57 likewise. A repo grep of http/ for on_request_redirect / response.history returns NONE — there is no redirect interception or Location revalidation.
Impact
Full readable SSRF that defeats the primary SSRF control on the very modules that correctly validate. Confidentiality of internal/metadata responses (C:H), S:C.
Proof of Concept
Verified live: http.get with allowlisted base 127.0.0.1 followed a 302 Location: http://127.0.0.2/... (non-allowlisted) and returned INTERNAL-VIA-REDIRECT.
Attack Chain
- Entry:
execute_module http.get {url:"http://attacker.tld/r"}(attacker 302->internal). Guard:validate_url_with_env_config(url)(get.py:104). Bypass proof: validation runs onattacker.tld(public) → passes; never re-run on the redirect target. - Sink:
session.get(url)(get.py:116) — noallow_redirectsarg → aiohttp default True. Bypass proof: grep ofhttp/foron_request_redirect/response.history→ NONE. - Impact: aiohttp follows 302 to the internal host; internal body returned (get.py:118).
Bypass Evidence
Live PoC followed a 302 into non-allowlisted loopback and returned the internal marker string. aiohttp ClientSession.get default allow_redirects=True; module never sets it False; no per-hop revalidation exists.
Affected Versions
<= 2.26.6 — get.py:116, request.py:60, batch.py:57 present on latest release tag.
Suggested Fix
Set allow_redirects=False and manually revalidate each Location header through validate_url_with_env_config before following, or cap and re-check every hop.
Credit
Vulnerability discovered by zx (Jace).
Пакеты
flyto-core
<= 2.26.6
2.26.7
Связанные уязвимости
Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.7, the HTTP modules http.get, http.request, and http.batch in src/core/modules/atomic/http/get.py, src/core/modules/atomic/http/request.py, and src/core/modules/atomic/http/batch.py validate only the initial URL, then follow redirects with allow_redirects=True and without per-hop Location revalidation, allowing a public URL to redirect into internal address space and return the internal response body. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.7.