Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
genetlink: fix genl_bind() invoking bind() after -EPERM
Per family bind/unbind callbacks were introduced to allow families to track multicast group consumer presence, e.g. to start or stop producing events depending on listeners.
However, in genl_bind() the bind() callback was invoked even if capability checks failed and ret was set to -EPERM. This means that callbacks could run on behalf of unauthorized callers while the syscall still returned failure to user space.
Fix this by only invoking bind() after "if (ret) break;" check i.e. after permission checks have succeeded.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
genetlink: fix genl_bind() invoking bind() after -EPERM
Per family bind/unbind callbacks were introduced to allow families to track multicast group consumer presence, e.g. to start or stop producing events depending on listeners.
However, in genl_bind() the bind() callback was invoked even if capability checks failed and ret was set to -EPERM. This means that callbacks could run on behalf of unauthorized callers while the syscall still returned failure to user space.
Fix this by only invoking bind() after "if (ret) break;" check i.e. after permission checks have succeeded.
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: genetlink: fix genl_bind() invoking bind() after -EPERM Per family bind/unbind callbacks were introduced to allow families to track multicast group consumer presence, e.g. to start or stop producing events depending on listeners. However, in genl_bind() the bind() callback was invoked even if capability checks failed and ret was set to -EPERM. This means that callbacks could run on behalf of unauthorized callers while the syscall still returned failure to user space. Fix this by only invoking bind() after "if (ret) break;" check i.e. after permission checks have succeeded.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: genetlink: fix genl_bind() invoking bind() after -EPERM Per family bind/unbind callbacks were introduced to allow families to track multicast group consumer presence, e.g. to start or stop producing events depending on listeners. However, in genl_bind() the bind() callback was invoked even if capability checks failed and ret was set to -EPERM. This means that callbacks could run on behalf of unauthorized callers while the syscall still returned failure to user space. Fix this by only invoking bind() after "if (ret) break;" check i.e. after permission checks have succeeded.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: g ...
ELSA-2025-25754: Unbreakable Enterprise kernel security update (IMPORTANT)
