Описание
Open WebUI: ReDoS in skill-mention regexes causes whole-instance DoS on default config
Summary
Two regexes in backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py that parse <$skillId|label> skill-mention tags backtrack in O(n²) on input that contains <$ followed by a long run with no closing >. Both run synchronously, on the asyncio event loop, on every chat completion with no feature gate. Because the default deployment is a single uvicorn worker, one such input pins a CPU core inside re and freezes the entire instance for all users until the worker is killed. Any authenticated user can trigger it with one chat message; it also fires accidentally on benign retrieved content (a RAG chunk or tool output) containing the pattern.
Affected versions
>= 0.9.2, < 0.10.0. Fixed in v0.10.0 (there is no 0.9.7 release).
SKILL_MENTION_RE(the extract pattern) has been O(n²) since v0.9.2; exploitable on 0.9.2–0.9.5 with a large input (hundreds of KB).- v0.9.6 added a second, far more aggressive O(n²) in the strip pattern (introduced by the "keep label as readable text" change), so on 0.9.6 a small input is enough to hang the instance.
Both are fixed by the same patch.
Affected component
backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py (line numbers as of v0.9.6):
extract_skill_ids_from_messages() runs before the if all_skill_ids: block (that guard gates only skill injection, not the regex), and strip_skill_mentions() runs with no guard at all. Neither requires a skill to exist or any setting to be enabled. Both functions are plain synchronous calls inside the async process_chat_payload coroutine, so they block the event loop; with the default UVICORN_WORKERS=1 (backend/start.sh) the whole instance stalls.
Root cause
[^|>] is a subset of [^>], so the quantifier pair [^|>]+ \|? [^>]* is ambiguous: on input that never closes with >, [^|>]+ greedily consumes the tail, > fails, and the engine backtracks through every split point between [^|>]+ and [^>]* — O(n) positions each doing O(n) work. Polynomial, not exponential, but more than enough to hang a single worker on a ~100 KB input.
Proof of concept
Standalone (no Open WebUI required):
Time quadruples per doubling of n (textbook O(n²)); the strip pattern runs for ~6 seconds on a 64k blob and for minutes on a ~96 KB one.
End-to-end against a live instance (default config):
docker run ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:v0.9.6on defaults.- Log in as any user (no admin or skill setup).
- Send a chat message containing
<$followed by 50k+ characters with no>. - One CPU core pegs in
re; UI and API stop responding for every user until the worker is killed.
Patch
Rewrite the optional |label as a non-capturing optional group so the two quantifiers no longer overlap. Both patterns become linear; captures and substituted output are unchanged on well-formed <$id|label>, <$id|>, and bare <$id> mentions.
After the patch the same hostile input returns in under 1 ms. Shipped in v0.10.0.
Credit
Reported by @Vlad-WKG, including a correct root-cause analysis and patch.
Пакеты
open-webui
>= 0.9.2, < 0.10.0
0.10.0
Связанные уязвимости
Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.9.2 before 0.10.0, the SKILL_MENTION_RE and strip_re regular expressions in backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py parsed <$skillId|label> skill mentions with overlapping quantifiers, allowing an authenticated chat message containing <$ without a closing > to trigger quadratic backtracking and block the asyncio event loop. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.