Описание
Contao: Possible path traversal in job download URIs
Summary
An authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing ../ segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside var/job-attachments.
The controller authorizes only the jobUuid route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled identifier, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. VirtualFilesystem::resolve() canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv becomes victim-job/debug_log.csv.
This is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values.
Root Cause
JobsController::downloadJobAttachment() checks access to the route jobUuid before loading the attachment:
Jobs::getAttachment() then resolves a path built from the authorized job UUID and the attacker-controlled identifier:
VirtualFilesystem::resolve() canonicalizes the combined path. It rejects absolute paths and paths that start with .., but it does not preserve the authorized job directory as a boundary:
Therefore:
canonicalizes to:
which remains inside the job-attachments filesystem mount and is accepted.
Recommended Fix
Treat the attachment identifier as a filename, not a path:
- Reject
/,\, NUL, and dot-segment components inidentifier. - Add a route requirement that prevents slashes in
{identifier}if nested attachment paths are not intended. - After resolving, assert the canonical relative path starts with
<authorized-job-uuid>/before returning aFilesystemItem. - Apply the same identifier validation in
Jobs::addAttachment()so future producers/extensions cannot write outside the owning job directory.
Impact
A low-privileged backend user can read another job's attachment if they know or obtain the target job UUID and attachment filename. Built-in crawler jobs attach CSV logs such as debug_log.csv, broken-link-checker_log.csv, and search-index_log.csv, which can contain crawled URLs, referring URLs, tags, and error messages.
Ссылки
- https://github.com/contao/contao/security/advisories/GHSA-grm4-wm43-9jh5
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55825
- https://contao.org/en/security-advisories/path-traversal-in-the-jobs-module
- https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/contao/contao/CVE-2026-55825.yaml
- https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/contao/core-bundle/CVE-2026-55825.yaml
Пакеты
contao/contao
>= 5.7.0, < 5.7.7
5.7.7
contao/core-bundle
>= 5.7.0, < 5.7.7
5.7.7
Связанные уязвимости
Contao is an Open Source CMS. In versions 5.7.0 through 5.7.6, an authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing ../ segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside var/job-attachments. The controller authorizes only the jobUuid route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled identifier, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. VirtualFilesystem::resolve() canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv becomes victim-job/debug_log.csv. This is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values.