Описание
GoFiber never set HSTS header in helmet middleware due to incorrect protocol check
Summary
The helmet middleware in gofiber/fiber never sets the Strict-Transport-Security (HSTS) response header, even when HSTSMaxAge is explicitly configured, because the condition check at helmet.go:67 uses c.Protocol() — which returns the HTTP protocol version string (e.g., "HTTP/1.1", "HTTP/2.0") — instead of c.Scheme() — which returns the URL scheme ("http" or "https"). Since c.Protocol() never equals "https" in any real deployment, the HSTS header is permanently disabled, defeating the security protection.
Details
Root cause: middleware/helmet/helmet.go, line 67:
c.Protocol() (defined at req.go:865-867) delegates to fasthttp.Request.Header.Protocol(), which returns the HTTP protocol version:
"HTTP/1.1"for HTTP/1.1 connections"HTTP/2.0"for HTTP/2 connections
The correct method is c.Scheme() (defined at req.go:844-862), which returns:
"http"for plain HTTP connections"https"for TLS connections
Since "HTTP/1.1" != "https" always evaluates to true, the entire HSTS block (lines 67-76) is dead code.
Note on test coverage: The existing helmet test (helmet_test.go) passes because it uses ctx.Request.Header.SetProtocol("https") to artificially force Protocol() to return "https". However, fasthttp.Request.Header.SetProtocol() sets the HTTP version field, and real HTTP requests never have protocol "https" — they have "HTTP/1.1" or "HTTP/2.0". The test is validating the wrong thing.
PoC
Clean-checkout maintainer-runnable recipe:
- Save the following as
middleware/helmet/poc_hsts_test.go:
- Run:
go test -run Test_PoC_HSTS_NeverSet -v ./middleware/helmet/
Expected vulnerable output:
Expected output after fix:
Observed output from this environment (commit ee98695f):
Negative/control case: With HSTSMaxAge: 0 (default), HSTS is correctly not set (this is expected behavior, not a bug).
Cleanup: Remove poc_hsts_test.go after verification.
Impact
The HSTS header is never applied in production, leaving all users vulnerable to:
- SSL stripping attacks: An active network attacker can downgrade HTTPS connections to HTTP, intercepting traffic between the client and server.
- Protocol downgrade: Without HSTS, browsers will silently accept HTTP connections to the site, even if the site supports HTTPS.
- Cookie theft over HTTP: Session cookies without the
Secureflag will be sent over HTTP if the user is tricked into an HTTP connection.
This affects any application that:
- Uses the
helmetmiddleware - Configures
HSTSMaxAge > 0expecting HSTS protection - Serves traffic over HTTPS
The vulnerability requires an active MITM attacker on the network path, which is realistic in public Wi-Fi, corporate networks, and ISP-level scenarios.
Suggested remediation
In middleware/helmet/helmet.go, line 67, replace c.Protocol() with c.Scheme():
Additionally, update the existing test to use a realistic TLS simulation instead of SetProtocol("https"):
Regression test: Add a test case that verifies HSTS is set when req.TLS is non-nil and HSTSMaxAge > 0, without using SetProtocol.
Пакеты
github.com/gofiber/fiber
<= 3.3.0
3.4.0
Связанные уязвимости
Fiber is an Express inspired web framework written in Go. Prior to 3.4.0, the helmet middleware in middleware/helmet/helmet.go never sets the Strict-Transport-Security response header even when HSTSMaxAge is configured because it checks c.Protocol() for https instead of c.Scheme(). This issue is fixed in version 3.4.0.
Fiber is an Express inspired web framework written in Go. Prior to 3.4.0, the helmet middleware in middleware/helmet/helmet.go never sets the Strict-Transport-Security response header even when HSTSMaxAge is configured because it checks c.Protocol() for https instead of c.Scheme(). This issue is fixed in version 3.4.0.