Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/core: Fix unconditional security_locked_down() call
Currently, the lockdown state is queried unconditionally, even though its result is used only if the PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR bit is set in attr.sample_type. While that doesn't matter in case of the Lockdown LSM, it causes trouble with the SELinux's lockdown hook implementation.
SELinux implements the locked_down hook with a check whether the current task's type has the corresponding "lockdown" class permission ("integrity" or "confidentiality") allowed in the policy. This means that calling the hook when the access control decision would be ignored generates a bogus permission check and audit record.
Fix this by checking sample_type first and only calling the hook when its result would be honored.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/core: Fix unconditional security_locked_down() call
Currently, the lockdown state is queried unconditionally, even though its result is used only if the PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR bit is set in attr.sample_type. While that doesn't matter in case of the Lockdown LSM, it causes trouble with the SELinux's lockdown hook implementation.
SELinux implements the locked_down hook with a check whether the current task's type has the corresponding "lockdown" class permission ("integrity" or "confidentiality") allowed in the policy. This means that calling the hook when the access control decision would be ignored generates a bogus permission check and audit record.
Fix this by checking sample_type first and only calling the hook when its result would be honored.
Ссылки
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-46971
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08ef1af4de5fe7de9c6d69f1e22e51b66e385d9b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4348d3b5027bc3ff6336368b6c60605d4ef8e1ce
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b246759284d6a2bc5b6f1009caeeb3abce2ec9ff
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7b0208ee370b89d20486fae71cd9abb759819c1
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f5809ca4c311b71bfaba6d13f4e39eab0557895e
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/core: Fix unconditional security_locked_down() call Currently, the lockdown state is queried unconditionally, even though its result is used only if the PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR bit is set in attr.sample_type. While that doesn't matter in case of the Lockdown LSM, it causes trouble with the SELinux's lockdown hook implementation. SELinux implements the locked_down hook with a check whether the current task's type has the corresponding "lockdown" class permission ("integrity" or "confidentiality") allowed in the policy. This means that calling the hook when the access control decision would be ignored generates a bogus permission check and audit record. Fix this by checking sample_type first and only calling the hook when its result would be honored.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/core: Fix unconditional security_locked_down() call Currently, the lockdown state is queried unconditionally, even though its result is used only if the PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR bit is set in attr.sample_type. While that doesn't matter in case of the Lockdown LSM, it causes trouble with the SELinux's lockdown hook implementation. SELinux implements the locked_down hook with a check whether the current task's type has the corresponding "lockdown" class permission ("integrity" or "confidentiality") allowed in the policy. This means that calling the hook when the access control decision would be ignored generates a bogus permission check and audit record. Fix this by checking sample_type first and only calling the hook when its result would be honored.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/core: Fix unconditional security_locked_down() call Currently, the lockdown state is queried unconditionally, even though its result is used only if the PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR bit is set in attr.sample_type. While that doesn't matter in case of the Lockdown LSM, it causes trouble with the SELinux's lockdown hook implementation. SELinux implements the locked_down hook with a check whether the current task's type has the corresponding "lockdown" class permission ("integrity" or "confidentiality") allowed in the policy. This means that calling the hook when the access control decision would be ignored generates a bogus permission check and audit record. Fix this by checking sample_type first and only calling the hook when its result would be honored.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: p ...
Уязвимость функции __do_sys_perf_event_open() модуля kernel/events/core.c ядра операционной системы Linux, позволяющая нарушителю оказать воздействие на целостность защищаемой информации