Описание
flat-to-nested: Prototype pollution in flat-to-nested convert() via proto parent/id key
Summary
convert() builds the nested tree by using each flat record's id and parent field values directly as object keys, with no guard against __proto__ / constructor / prototype. A record whose parent is the string "__proto__" makes temp[parent] resolve to Object.prototype, and the following initPush(...) writes attacker-controlled data onto the global prototype. Any application that passes attacker-influenced records to convert() is affected, and the base prototype methods stay intact so the pollution is stealthy.
Details
In index.js, convert() (FlatToNested.prototype.convert):
temp = {}(line 45) andpendingChildOf = {}(line 46) are plain objects, so they inherit fromObject.prototype.- For each record,
parent = flatEl[this.config.parent](line 51) is taken verbatim from input. - Line 57:
if (temp[parent] !== undefined)— whenparent === "__proto__",temp["__proto__"]resolves via the prototype chain toObject.prototype, which is!== undefined, so the branch is taken. - Line 59:
initPush(this.config.children, temp[parent], flatEl)→ effectivelyinitPush("children", Object.prototype, flatEl). initPush(lines 4-9):Object.prototype["children"] = []thenObject.prototype["children"].push(flatEl)— attacker-controlled data is written onto the globalObject.prototype.
There is no sanitization of id / parent anywhere; they flow straight into temp[id], temp[parent], and pendingChildOf[parent] as dynamic keys.
PoC
Impact
Prototype pollution (CWE-1321). Any service that builds a tree from attacker-influenced flat records (the package's core purpose — e.g. records derived from a DB/REST/user input) can have Object.prototype polluted. Consequences range from application-logic corruption and denial of service to serving as a gadget toward privilege escalation or RCE depending on downstream sinks. No special privileges or user interaction required; the malicious value is ordinary input data.
Suggested fix
Use prototype-less lookup tables so inherited keys like proto cannot be reached: var temp = Object.create(null); var pendingChildOf = Object.create(null); (Optionally also reject id/parent values equal to proto, constructor, or prototype.) Verified: with Object.create(null) for both temp and pendingChildOf, the PoC no longer pollutes Object.prototype and normal nesting output is unchanged. A patch with a regression test is ready.
Пакеты
flat-to-nested
<= 1.1.1
1.1.2
Связанные уязвимости
flat-to-nested converts a hierarchy from a flat representation to a nested representation. Prior to 1.1.2, FlatToNested.prototype.convert in index.js uses attacker-influenced id and parent record fields directly as keys in the plain temp and pendingChildOf objects. When parent or id is __proto__, temp[parent] can resolve to Object.prototype, and initPush() can write attacker-controlled data to the global children prototype property while existing prototype methods remain intact. Any application that passes attacker-influenced flat records to convert() can therefore expose unrelated objects to polluted inherited state, causing application-logic corruption or denial of service and potentially enabling greater impact when a downstream prototype-pollution gadget is present. The constructor and prototype strings are also unsafe inherited-key values in the same lookup design. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.2.