Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_VLEK_LOAD)
Sashiko notes:
if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g., SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the host?
The SEV firmware docs for SNP_VLEK_LOAD note:
On SNP_SHUTDOWN, the VLEK is deleted.
That is, the initialization/shutdown wrapper here is pointless, because the firmware immediately throws away the key anyway. Instead, refuse to do anything if SNP has not been previously initialized.
This is an ABI break: before, this was a no-op and almost certainly a mistake by userspace, and now it returns -ENODEV. ABI compatibility could be maintained here by simply returning 0 in the check instead.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_VLEK_LOAD)
Sashiko notes:
if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g., SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the host?
The SEV firmware docs for SNP_VLEK_LOAD note:
On SNP_SHUTDOWN, the VLEK is deleted.
That is, the initialization/shutdown wrapper here is pointless, because the firmware immediately throws away the key anyway. Instead, refuse to do anything if SNP has not been previously initialized.
This is an ABI break: before, this was a no-op and almost certainly a mistake by userspace, and now it returns -ENODEV. ABI compatibility could be maintained here by simply returning 0 in the check instead.
Ссылки
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64308
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/61cf5eef20657bff9ca235fe938a99ce5ff65c06
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8836801847b9479ac046cb18a24981e1b0b05e9d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/92567ed9306d5a3d1b007eb4faeff30cc3ffc3e4
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f91e9dbb5845d1e5abf1028e6df57dcf61583e1b
EPSS
CVE ID
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_VLEK_LOAD) Sashiko notes: > if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a > userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g., > SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN > execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the > host? The SEV firmware docs for SNP_VLEK_LOAD note: > On SNP_SHUTDOWN, the VLEK is deleted. That is, the initialization/shutdown wrapper here is pointless, because the firmware immediately throws away the key anyway. Instead, refuse to do anything if SNP has not been previously initialized. This is an ABI break: before, this was a no-op and almost certainly a mistake by userspace, and now it returns -ENODEV. ABI compatibility could be maintained here by simply returning 0 in the check instead.
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's crypto: ccp module, which handles AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) and Secure Nested Paging (SNP) features. A local user, by sending specific commands through the /dev/sev interface, could exploit improper initialization handling. If SEV initialization has failed and virtual machines are active, this could lead to a system crash, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_VLEK_LOAD) Sashiko notes: > if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a > userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g., > SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN > execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the > host? The SEV firmware docs for SNP_VLEK_LOAD note: > On SNP_SHUTDOWN, the VLEK is deleted. That is, the initialization/shutdown wrapper here is pointless, because the firmware immediately throws away the key anyway. Instead, refuse to do anything if SNP has not been previously initialized. This is an ABI break: before, this was a no-op and almost certainly a mistake by userspace, and now it returns -ENODEV. ABI compatibility could be maintained here by simply returning 0 in the check instead.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: c ...
EPSS